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Double Jeopardy:  
Patents of Invention as Contracts, 
Invention Disclosure as Consideration, 
and Where Oil States Went Wrong 
N. Scott Pierce* 
Patents in England were once favors granted by the King with 
the requirement that the subject matter be practiced, or worked, for 
the benefit of the public. However, by the late eighteenth century 
patents were viewed as contracts with the government. Concomitant 
with this shift, the requirement to practice an invention was replaced 
by submission of a written specification disclosing to the public how 
to work the subject matter of the patent. In essence, advancement of 
the public good by grant of an exclusionary right to practice an  
invention at royal discretion was substituted with public disclosure 
as consideration for grant of that right by contract. The contractual 
nature of patents that evolved in England was adopted in the United 
States shortly after its founding. 
Disclosure of an invention can be offered as consideration by an 
inventor because, unlike most substance of sovereign dispensation, 
it is not otherwise available. Also unlike favor, disclosure of an  
invention cannot be withdrawn once it has been made. The Supreme 
Court in Oil States v. Greene’s Energy Group failed to acknowledge 
these distinctions by improperly construing nineteenth century dicta 
to conclude that patents “take from the public rights of immense 
value” and by asserting more recent dicta that inter partes review 
is nothing but “a second look” at an earlier administrative decision. 
Dismissing the genesis and irretrievable nature of invention dis- 
 
*  Partner at Foley Hoag LLP in Boston, MA. The author is solely responsible for the 
views of this Article, which do not necessarily represent those of his Firm, or any client or 
organization. 
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closure by implying that patent rights are taken from the public  
by virtue of patent grant obliterates the distinction made over two  
hundred years ago that patents are not privileges subject to  
sovereign volition. 
The Supreme Court’s new understanding of patents causes an 
overlap of Article I “legislative courts” under the purview of the 
executive branch, with “constitutional courts” controlled by  
Article III of the Constitution. The result is double jeopardy for  
patentees and reduced certainty in the business community, both  
of which are anathema to the intent behind creation of ex parte  
reexamination, introduced under the Bayh–Dole Act of 1980, and 
extending to the several proceedings inaugurated with the America 
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That labour put a distinction between them and  
common. That added something to them more than 
nature, the common mother of all, had done, and so 
they became his private right. 
–John Locke1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court held in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. 
Greene’s Energy Group, LLC that inter partes review (“inter partes 
review” or “IPR”) “does not violate Article III or the Seventh 
Amendment.”2 An IPR is one of five post-grant proceedings insti-
tuted under the America Invents Act (“AIA”),3 the others being  
covered business methods (“CBMs”),4 post grant review (“PGR”),5 
supplemental examination,6 and derivation proceedings,7 all of 
which are conducted by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board 
(“PTAB”) of the United States Patent and Trademark Office (vari-
ously “USPTO,” “PTO,” or “Patent Office”). A primary motive for 
enacting IPRs was a general impression that the economic benefit  
of patents was being impeded by a large number of “low quality” 
patents covering subject matter not deserving of protection, and that 
 
1 JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 20 (Prometheus Books 
1986) (1690). 
2 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 
(2018) (“Because inter partes review does not violate Article III or the Seventh 
Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”). The Court affirmed a 
judgment by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) upholding a final written 
decision in an IPR by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) at the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO, PTO, or Patent Office). In that proceeding, the PTAB 
determined claims 1 and 22 of U.S. Patent No. 6,179,053 (‘053 patent), owned by Oil States 
Energy Services, LLC (Oil States), to be unpatentable. See Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC v. 
Oil States Energy Servs., LLC, No. IPR2014-00216, 2015 Pat. App. LEXIS 5328, *1 
(P.T.A.B. May 1, 2015). 
3 Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C. (2018)). In many sources, “AIA 35 U.S.C.” is 
used to refer to the now-codified updated provisions, while “Pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.” is used 
to refer to the provisions in place prior to the AIA amendments. 
4 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (AIA § 18). 
5 See id. §§ 321–29. 
6 See id. § 257. 
7 See id. § 135. 
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a relatively low-cost alternative to invalidation of patents during lit-
igation was required.8 
IPRs replaced another post-grant proceeding, inter partes reex-
amination, that was enacted in 1999 under the American Inventors 
Protection Act9 (“AIPA”) to supplement and correct some of the 
perceived injustices of an even earlier proceeding, ex parte reexam-
ination, instituted in 1980 as part of the Bayh–Dole Act.10 Neither 
ex parte nor inter partes reexamination were much used, about 
14,000 ex parte petitions having been filed since 1980,11 and about 
2,000 inter partes reexamination petitions having been filed between 
November 29, 1999 and September 16, 2012.12 In contrast, IPRs 
have been heavily relied upon, over 8,800 petitions having been 
filed since 2012, and have been a highly successful tool to  
invalidate existing patents, 64% of petitions being found to have  
no claims patentable, and another 17% finding at least one claim 
was unpatentable.13 
Counsel for Oil States did not contest the constitutionality of 
reexamination, asserting at oral hearing that such proceedings, 
whether ex parte or inter partes, were “fundamentally examina-
tional,” meaning that third-party participation was “fundamentally a 
proceeding between the Patent and Trademark Office, between the 
 
8 See, e.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 909 (2015) 
(“The America Invents Act was nearly a decade in the making and was preceded by a 
constant drumbeat in academic journals, judicial opinions, and congressional speeches 
decrying the proliferation of ‘low quality’ patents that harm innovation and impose 
significant costs on consumers.”). 
9 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 
1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19 (2018)) (replaced with inter partes review 
(IPR) by AIA). 
10 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh–Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, § 
302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302). 
11 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Ex Parte Reexamination Filing Data (Sept. 30, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ex_parte_historical_stats_roll_up.pd
f [https://perma.cc/D4NB-XY6V]. 
12 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data (Sept. 30, 
2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/inter_parte_historical_stats_ 
roll_up.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K26-NGME]. 
13 Id.; see also U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., PAT. TRIAL & APPEAL BOARD, Trial 
Statistics IPR, PGR, CBM (Nov. 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/trial_statistics_nov_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/LY9S-MPX7]. 
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government and the Patent Owner.”14 IPRs, on the other hand, were 
viewed as “adjudicational.”15 This distinction was nowhere men-
tioned in the ultimate majority opinion. Justice Thomas, who wrote 
the majority opinion, upheld IPRs as “simply a reconsideration” of 
“a matter involving public rights—specifically, the grant of a public 
franchise.”16 According to the Court, “Congress has permissibly  
reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration.”17 
Neither the majority opinion, Justice Breyer’s concurrence, nor 
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent distinguished the constitutionality of ex 
parte reexamination from AIA post-grant examination, such as 
IPRs. Perhaps there is no such distinction. If not, then the constitu-
tionality of ex parte reexamination and AIA post-grant examination 
may stand or fall together. 
This Article challenges justifications employed by Justice 
Thomas to hold that IPRs pass constitutional muster, including 
sweeping characterization of patents as “public rights”18 and “public 
franchises,”19 and that “reconsideration” of the grant of a patent is  
a “simple” matter “permissibly reserved by Congress” to the PTO.20 
If these assertions and underlying arguments supporting the holding 
in Oil States are wrong, then any basis for concluding otherwise  
in Oil States should be examined and compared with more  
well-established post-grant Article I proceedings, such as reissue,  
interference, and, in particular, ex parte reexamination proceedings. 
Justice Breyer, in his concurrence, for example, stated that “the 
Court’s opinion should not be read to say that matters involving  
private rights may never be adjudicated other than by Article III 
 
14 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy 
Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16-712) [hereinafter Transcript]. 
15 Id. at 4, 7. 
16 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (emphasis added). 
17 Id. 
18 Id. (“This Court has long held that the grant of a patent is a “‘matte[r] involving public 
rights’” . . . . It has the key features to fall within this Court’s longstanding formulation of 
the public rights doctrine.”) (quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 582–83 (1899)). 
19 Id. (“This Court has recognized, and the parties do not dispute, that the decision to 
grant a patent is matter involving public rights—specifically the grant of a public 
franchise.”). 
20 Id. (“Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has 
permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct that reconsideration.”). 
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courts, say, sometimes by agencies,”21 and quoted another recent 
Supreme Court case, Stern v. Marshall, which stated that “[t]he 
presence of ‘private rights’ does not automatically determine the 
outcome of the question but requires a more ‘searching’ examina-
tion of the relevant factors.”22 Following Justice Breyer’s logic, if it 
can be established that patent rights of invention are, indeed, private 
rights, then “more ‘searching’” examination may well “determine 
the outcome of the question” of adjudication of rights in granted  
patents outside Article III courts. 
Part I of this Article is an overview of the closest historical  
antecedents to post-grant examination under the AIA, namely  
ex parte and inter partes reexamination. Part II will summarize  
the majority and dissenting opinions of Oil States, analyze the  
majority’s characterization of patents as “public franchises,” and 
then briefly critique the majority’s view of patent “public rights” as 
embodying “public interests” in the interest of separation of powers. 
Part III will briefly address Oil States’ perfunctory analysis of  
the Seventh Amendment as applied to patent rights. Part IV will  
distinguish “private” from “public” rights, and the authority of 
so-called “legislative,” or “Article I” courts, such as the PTAB, to 
adjudicate rights that are deemed only “seemingly private” under 
recent Supreme Court precedent. Part V will look at the broader  
implications of protecting patents as private rights. 
Finally, Part VI will summarize the historical view that patents 
are not just private rights, but contracts between the government and 
private entities premised on legal consideration of disclosure by the 
patentee. This Part will also analyze In re Baxter International, 
Inc.23 and Fresenius USA, Inc. v Baxter International, Inc.24 as a 
joint case study in some of the possible effects of overlapping juris-
diction between the PTAB of the Patent Office as a “legislative,” or 
Article I court, under the control of the executive branch, and  
“constitutional,” or “Article III” courts of the judiciary branch, and 
 
21 Id. at 1380 (Breyer, J. concurring) (emphasis added). 
22 Id. (Breyer J., concurring) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 513 (2011) 
(Breyer J., dissenting)). 
23 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
24 Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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makes a plea for reconsideration of the constitutionality and wisdom 
of post-grant examination of patents in Article I courts. 
This Article concludes that, because patents are contracts and 
private property of the patentee, and because the disclosure given as 
consideration by the patentee cannot be returned, the government 
cannot subject patents to “reconsideration of the grant” without  
inherently breaking that contract, in violation of historical applica-
tions of the Constitution’s Takings Clause.25 
I. ANTECEDENTS TO INTER PARTES REVIEW—EX PARTE AND 
INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 
Prior to enactment of the AIA, members of the public had  
recourse to two established proceedings at the USPTO for examina-
tion of granted patents, namely ex parte reexamination and inter 
partes reexamination. Ex parte reexamination was instituted in 1980 
as part of the Bayh–Dole Act,26 and inter partes reexamination was 
added under the AIPA in 1999.27 Inter partes reexamination was  
replaced by IPR with the enactment of the AIA.28 
Ex parte reexamination was (and is) available to “any person,” 
including the patent owner,29 while inter partes reexamination  
 
25 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[Nor] shall private property be taken for public use, without 
just compensation.”); see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: 
The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 724 
(2007) (“It is time to set the historical record straight and to recognize that 
nineteenth-century courts applied the Takings Clause to patents, securing these intangible 
property rights as constitutional private property.”). 
26 Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh–Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 30, § 
302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018)). 
27 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 
1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19) (replaced with inter partes review (IPR) by 
AIA). 
28 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(a), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) 
(codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
29 35 U.S.C. § 302 (1988) reads as follows: 
Any person at any time may file a request for reexamination by the 
Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art cited under 
the provisions of section 301 [35 U.S.C.S. § 301]. The request must be 
in writing and must be accompanied by payment of a reexamination 
fee established by the Director pursuant to the provisions of section 41 
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was available to any “third party requestor.”30 The threshold for 
grant of a petition for ex parte or inter partes reexamination was a 
“substantial new question of patentability.”31 Promoted as an inex-
pensive alternative to litigation that would give greater assurance to 
patentees of the value of their patents, reexamination was directly 
targeted to enabling the Government “to uphold its agreement with 
an inventor that in exchange for disclosure of new inventions the 
inventor’s rights will be protected.”32 Nevertheless, several features 
of ex parte reexamination proved to be shortcomings.33 For example, 
neither the petitioner nor any other member of the public was  
estopped from employing prior art references from a past examina-
tion.34 Further, there was no limit to the number of times petitions 
could be filed by any member of the public for ex parte reexamina-
tion (so long as a “substantial new question of patentability” could 
be established), and the same argument could be successfully relied 
 
[35 U.S.C.S. § 41]. The request must set forth the pertinency and 
manner of applying cited prior art to every claim for which 
reexamination is requested. Unless the requesting person is the owner 
of the patent, the Director promptly will send a copy of the request to 
the owner of record of the patent. 
30 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988) (repealed 1999) (“Any third party requester at any time 
may file a request for inter partes reexamination by the Office of a patent on the basis of 
any prior art cited under the provisions of section 301 [35 U.S.C. § 301].”). 
31 35 U.S.C. §§ 303, 312 (1988). 
32 Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S.1679 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th 
Congress, 1st Sess. (1979) (statement of Senator Birch Bayh, Member, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary) [hereinafter Patent Reexamination Hearing]. Senator Bayh stated: 
This bill provides an inexpensive alternative to litigation in patent 
validity cases by allowing the Patent Office to consider new data that 
might have been overlooked during the initial patent examination and 
determine whether or not the patent should have been issued. 
*** 
The present weaknesses in our patent system mean that our 
Government is no longer able to uphold its agreement with an inventor 
that in exchange for disclosure of new inventions the inventor’s rights 
will be protected. 
Id. at 1–2. 
33 See, e.g., Dolin, supra note 8, at 909 (“The combination of these factors [in ex parte 
reexamination] gives the patent challengers the opportunity to continuously cast doubt on 
legitimate patent claims and to ‘black mail’ patent holders into lower royalty rates.”). 
34 Id. at 905 n.161 (“[R]eexamination is not precluded by the fact that a patent or printed 
publication was previously cited by or to the Office or considered by the Office.”) (citing 
35 U.S.C. § 303(a)). 
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upon in court.35 Inter partes reexamination was introduced to avoid 
abuse of reexamination by including an estoppel provision under  
35 U.S.C. § 315(c).36 In both ex parte and inter partes reexamination, 
however, despite surviving a validity challenge in court, a  
patent could be found invalid on the same arguments during a  
subsequent proceeding before the Board of Patent Appeals and  
Interferences.37 The reverse was also true, as was the possibility that 
a “substantially new question of patentability” might be found in  
a “patent or printed publication . . . previously cited by or to the  
[Patent] Office or considered by the Office.”38 These problems 
placed patentees in double jeopardy and, for ex parte reexamination, 
still do.39 
In addition, while courts maintain a presumption of patent  
validity that can only be overcome by clear and convincing  
evidence,40 there was no such presumption during ex parte or inter 
partes reexamination. Instead, the standard of proof was a much 
lower “preponderance of the evidence.”41 Moreover, while courts 
applied a so-called “ordinary and customary meaning” standard to 
claim construction under Phillips v. AWH Corp.,42 the USPTO  
applied a more inclusive “broadest reasonable interpretation” 
(“BRI”).43 Even on appeal, a presumption of validity would not  
be observed, nor would claims be reviewed under the Phillips  
 
35 Id. at 903–04. 
36 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (1988) (repealed 1999) (“A third-party requestor whose request 
for an inter partes re-examination results in an order under section 313 [35 U.S.C. § 313] 
is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any civil action arising in whole or in part . . . 
the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground 
which the third-party requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes 
reexamination proceedings.”). 
37 Dolin, supra note 8, at 904 (citing In re Baxter Int’l, 678 F.3d 1357, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2012)). The BPAI was the immediate predecessor at the Patent Office to the PTAB. 
38 See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (2018). See id. at 902 n.144. 
39 Id. Moreover, ex parte reexamination puts the PTAB, the successor to the BPAI, in 
conflict with the Art. III courts, as will be discussed in Part VI, infra. 
40 See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011). 
41 Dome Patent L.P. v. Lee, 799 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
42 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
43 See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 
(MPEP) § 2103 (9th ed. 2014) (last revised Jan. 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/
web/offices/pac/mpep/s2103.html [https://perma.cc/TQ8Z-DPRP]. 
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“ordinary and customary meaning” standard as they would be absent 
appeal from the BPAI.44 
Ex parte and inter partes reexamination shared many of the  
features that were viewed as shortcomings to be addressed by the 
AIA.45 Nevertheless, only inter partes reexamination, which  
provided for estoppel, and therefore thought to be an improvement 
over ex parte reexamination,46 was repealed and substituted with 
IPR; ex parte reexamination was left in place. Inter partes review 
continued many problematic aspects of ex parte and inter partes 
reexamination, such as high cost, delay, and a lower threshold to 
demonstrate invalidity, and even added new hurdles for patentees, 
 
44 For inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR) and covered business methods 
(CBM), this standard recently has been changed at the Patent Office, whereby the standard 
for claim construction is now that of Phillips. Changes to the Claim Construction Standard 
for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 
Fed. Reg. 51,340 (Oct. 11, 2018) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). However, the BRI standard 
remains in place for reexamination, reissue, supplemental examination, and derivation 
proceedings. See, e.g., Scott McKeown, Patent Owners May Rue the Day They Pushed the 
PTAB to Phillips, ROPES & GRAY: PATS. POST-GRANT (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.patentspostgrant.com/patent-owners-will-rue-day-pushed-ptab-philips/ 
[https://perma.cc/5WXG-LKLQ]. 
45 See Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Begins Debate on Leahy–Smith 
America Invents Act (Sept. 6, 2011), available at https://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/
senate-begins-debate-on-leahy-smith-america-invents-act [https://perma.cc/SQ54-UVCJ] 
(“The bill will also improve upon the current system for challenging the validity of a patent 
at the PTO. The current inter partes reexamination process has been criticized for being too 
easy to initiate and used to harass legitimate patent owners, while being too lengthy and 
unwieldy to actually serve as an alternative to ligation when users are confronted with 
patents of dubious validity.”). 
46 See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Advantages of Inter Partes Reexamination, 90 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 579 (2008); see also Dolin, supra note 8, at 903: 
[E]ven if the PTO were to confirm the patent in the reexamination 
proceedings (or if it failed to even initiate such proceedings for lack of 
a substantial new question of patentability under section 102 or section 
103) that does not prevent the putative infringer from re-arguing the 
issue or arguing any other grounds of invalidity in court. 
(citing N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination: Recommendations for 
Change Based Upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 945, 
954 (1994)) (“Unless the patent is invalidated or ‘substantively’ altered, there is absolutely 
no binding legal effect of the reexamination. Therefore, even though a patent has been 
reexamined and a certificate of reexamination has issued, the courts are free to 
subsequently invalidate the patent on the basis of the same prior art that was analyzed 
during the reexamination.”). 
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such as a more limited opportunity to amend claims.47 Like reexam-
ination before it, inter partes review also suffers from the problem 
of “serial” petitions that allow successive challenges to patents by 
third parties as a tactical measure to weaken patentees, and even  
to enable those third parties to leverage disproportionately large  
resources held by unrelated business “players.”48 
An underlying concern with post-grant examination of any type, 
not just ex parte or inter partes reexamination, but also PGR, IPR, 
and CBM, all of which were borne of the AIA, is the relationship 
between decisions made with respect to granted patents by the 
PTAB as an executive body under Article I of the Constitution, and 
the federal judiciary under Article III. Such an analysis, however, 
must address the nature of granted patents in the United States and, 
more particularly, assess the Supreme Court’s recent characteriza-
tion in Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, 
LLC of patents as “public rights—specifically, the grant of a public 
 
47 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(d)(1) (2018): 
(d) Amendment of the Patent. 
(1) In general—During an inter partes review instituted under 
this chapter, the patent owner may file 1 motion to amend the 
patent in 1 or more of the following ways: 
(A) Cancel any challenged patent claim. 
(B) For each challenged claim, propose a reasonable 
number of substitute claims. 
By way of contrast, there is no limit in ex parte reexamination to the opportunities to amend 
claims and, likewise, there was no such limit in inter partes reexamination. 
48 While 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) for inter partes review, and 35 U.S.C. § 325(e) for post-
grant review provide for estoppel on “any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably 
could have raised” during each respective proceeding, several avenues for abuse, including 
various embodiments of “serial petitions,” have been documented. See, e.g., Dolin, supra 
note 8, at 931; see also Letter from Sen. Thom Tillis (R-NC) and Chris Coons (D-DE) of 
the Committee on the Judiciary to the Honorable Andrei Iancu (Apr. 9, 2019), available at 




(requesting answers to questions addressing concerns from “patent stakeholders about 
abuse of the inter partes review process in the form of ‘serial’ petitions”). Additional 
documentation can be found at Tillis, Coons Ask Iancu to Take Action on Serial IPR 
Challenges, IPWATCHDOG (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/04/10/
tillis-coons-ask-iancu-take-action-serial-ipr-challenges/id=108143/ [https://perma.cc/
5UW3-4X6W]. 
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franchise,” whereby “[i]nter partes review is simply a reconsidera-
tion of that grant [that] Congress has permissibly reserved [to the] 
PTO . . . .”49 Placing this holding by the Supreme Court in historical 
context should provide some insight into the relative susceptibility 
of patents to “reconsideration” under and among the distinct  
standards affecting validity in Article I and Article III courts. 
II. OIL STATES AND ARTICLE III 
Oil States Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC 
held that inter partes review does not violate Article III, and does 
not violate the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. Part II.A 
will summarize the majority opinion, including conclusions by the 
Court that patents are “public franchises” and that inter partes  
review falls within “public rights doctrine,” making patents subject 
to reconsideration by authority reserved to the PTO by Congress. 
Part II.B provides short critiques of Justice Thomas’ majority  
opinion and Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, as well as the effect of 
Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, which factored into the 
majority opinion. Part II.C analyzes historical characterization  
of patents as “franchises,” and Part II.D addresses the impact of  
“public interest” in patents as “public rights” on patent validity and 
constitutional separation of powers. 
A. Summary of the Majority Opinion—The Patent “Franchise” of 
“Public Rights” 
The Court in Oil States decided that a determination of patent 
validity by inter partes review at the Patent Office was a violation of 
neither Article III nor the Seventh Amendment.50 The Court began 
 
49 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 
(2018). 
50 Id. at 1370 (“In this case we address whether inter partes review violates Article III or 
the Seventh Amendment of the Constitution. We hold that it violates neither.”). The 
relevant sections of Art. III state: 
ARTICLE III 
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested 
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish . . . . 
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by acknowledging that “[t]he America Invents Act replaced inter 
partes reexamination with inter partes review,”51 and that “[t]he  
primary distinction between inter partes review and the initial grant 
of a patent is that inter partes review occurs after the patent has  
issued.”52 Concluding that such a “distinction does not matter 
here”53 and relying on its own precedent, Cuozzo Speed Technolo-
gies, LLC v. Lee54 and Crowell v. Benson,55 the majority stated that 
“the PTO has ‘the authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel— 
a patent claim’ in an inter partes review,”56 and that “[p]atents thus 
remain ‘subject to [the Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside of an 
Article III court.”57 
IPRs were upheld under both Article III and the Seventh Amend-
ment on a presumed distinction between “public rights” and “private 
rights,” wherein, according to Justice Thomas, “[Supreme Court] 
precedents have given Congress significant latitude to assign adju-
dication of public rights to entities other than Article III courts.”58 
He admitted that, “[t]his Court has not ‘definitively explained’ the 
distinction between public and private rights”59 and that  
“precedents applying the public-rights doctrine have ‘not been  
entirely consistent.’”60 Nevertheless, the majority opinion held that 
 
*** 
Section 2. [1] The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United 
States, . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
Party . . . . 
U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. The Seventh Amendment states: 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United 
States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
U.S. CONST. amend VII. 
51 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1371. 
52 Id. at 1374. 
53 Id. 
54 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016). 
55 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
56 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137). 
57 Id. (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50). 
58 Id. at 1373 (emphasis added). 
59 Id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)). 
60 Id. (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 488 (2011)). 
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“[i]nter partes review falls squarely within the public-rights  
doctrine.”61 In particular, Justice Thomas stated for the majority that 
“the decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—
specifically, the grant of a public franchise,” and that “[i]nter partes 
review is simply a reconsideration of that grant,” for which  
“Congress has permissibly reserved the PTO’s authority to conduct 
that reconsideration.”62 Yet, despite reciting several Supreme Court 
cases that referenced patents as “public franchises,” the term  
“franchise” was not defined in Oil States, nor were “public rights” 
distinguished from “private rights” in the context of granted patents. 
The Court’s holding regarding the Seventh Amendment was 
seemingly dismissed as an afterthought to “proper” adjudication. As 
stated by the Court, “when Congress properly assigns a matter to 
adjudication in a non-Article III tribunal, ‘the Seventh Amendment 
poses no independent bar to the adjudication of that action by a  
nonjury factfinder.’”63
 
B. Historical Precedent to Article III Consideration of Patent 
Validity 
Justice Thomas made sweeping characterizations regarding the 
fundamental nature of patents and, in doing so, either dismissed or 
misrepresented dicta from several seminal nineteenth-century cases 
defining the source of patent rights and their relation to other 
well-established kinds of exclusivity granted by the government. 
Part II.B.1 is a short critique of the majority opinion in view  
of nineteenth-century precedent. Part II.B.2 reviews Justice Gor-
such’s dissent, and Part II.B.3 assesses the effect of another recent 
decision by the Court, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, 
which was relied upon by Justice Thomas in his majority opinion. 
1. A Short Critique of the Majority View of 
Nineteenth-Century Precedent 
Drawing language from the nineteenth-century Supreme Court 
decision of United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., Justice 
 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1374. 
63 Id. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53–54 (1989)). 
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Thomas asserted that, “[b]y ‘issuing patents,’ the PTO ‘take[s] from 
the public rights of immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the 
patentee.’”64 However, the majority in Oil States misapplied this 
language from judicial precedent in that the Court in American Bell 
was not referring to a broad power of the Patent Office to rescind 
granted patents. Instead, the Court’s immediate focus was more  
narrow, holding only with respect to certain “patents which are here 
sought to be annulled.”65 In dicta, however, the Court did not limit 
its opinion to a question of entitlement “to obtain a cancellation or 
vacation of an instrument obtained from [the Patent Office] by fraud 
and deceit . . . ,” but, rather, broadly considered “the affirmative  
relief to which the United States is entitled.”66 Nevertheless, and 
contrary to Justice Thomas’s broad assertion, “absent fraud and  
deceit” on the Patent Office, there is no indication that the Court in 
American Bell viewed grant of a patent, in and of itself, as taking 
rights from the public. For example, mistake by the Patent Office 
might well include the grant of the exclusionary right of a patent  
in exchange for subject matter that would not have been made avail-
able to the public but for disclosure by the patentee in consideration 
of that right.67 
 
64 Id. at 1373 (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)). 
65 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 370 (“The United States, by issuing the patents which are 
here sought to be annulled, has taken from the public rights of immense value, and 
bestowed then upon the patentee.”) (emphasis added). It should be noted that the suit was 
brought by the United States against American Bell Telephone Company alleging fraud on 
the Patent Office. Id. at 353 (“The bill alleges that Bell, the patentee, knew at the time of 
filing his application [at the Patent Office] that he was not the original and first 
inventor . . . .”). 
66 Id. at 373. As stated by the Court in American Bell: 
There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting 
the power of the government of the United States of America to get rid 
of a patent obtained by fraud and deceit; . . . we think the argument that 
this was intended to supersede the affirmative relief to which the 
United States is entitled, to obtain a cancellation or vacation of an 
instrument obtained from it by fraud, an instrument which affects the 
whole public, whose protection from such a fraud is eminently the duty 
of the United States, is not sound. 
Id. 
67 See, e.g., Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he patent right to exclude a party from practicing a particular 
invention is never held by the sovereign, but only by the patentee after issuance.”). 
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In dicta, the Court in American Bell clearly delineated the limits 
of executive authority by stating that, while “fraud in the patentee” 
is not the only judicial ground upon which a patent can be invali-
dated by a court,68 a “patent is but evidence of a grant, and the  
officer who issues it acts ministerially and not judicially.”69 To make 
its point, the Court in American Bell drew a parallel with land pa-
tents, stating that, “[t]he power . . . to issue a patent for an invention, 
and the authority to issue such an instrument for a grant of land, 
emanate from the same source; and, although exercised by different 
bureaus or officers under the government, are of the same nature, 
character, and validity, and imply in each case the exercise of the 
power of the government according to modes regulated by acts of 
congress.”70 The Court in American Bell then quoted United 
States v. Stone, which was directed to land patents, stating that “[a] 
patent is the highest evidence title, and is conclusive against the gov-
ernment, and all claiming under junior patents or titles, until it is set 
aside or annulled by some judicial tribunal,” and that “one officer  
of the land-office is not competent to cancel or annul the act of his 
predecessor. That is a judicial act, and requires the judgment of  
a court.”71 
Justice Thomas dismissed statements in American Bell, as well 
as those of other precedent, such as McCormick Harvesting Machine 
Co. v. Aultman,72 decided ten years after American Bell, which  
limited the authority to “set a patent aside, or to annul it, or to correct 
it for any reason, whatever,” to “the courts of the United States.”73 
Both cases were distinguished by Justice Thomas as having been 
“decided under the Patent Act of 1870,” which “did not include  
any provision for post-issuance administrative review.”74 For  
 
68 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 365. (“Nor is fraud in the patentee the only ground upon 
which a bill [of complaint] will be sustained. Patents are sometimes issued unadvisedly or 
by mistake, where the Office has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party 
has a higher equity, and should have received the patent.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 358–59. 
71 Id. at 365 (quoting United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864)). 
72 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606 (1898). 
73 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1376 
(2018) (quoting McCormick, 169 U.S. at 609). 
74 Id. 
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Justice Thomas, “[t]hose precedents, then, are best read as a descrip-
tion of the statutory scheme that existed at that time. They do not 
resolve Congress’s authority under the Constitution to establish a 
different scheme.”75 
Justice Thomas in Oil States also relied on twentieth-century 
precedent, Graham v. John Deere,76 to support the argument that 
IPRs are only a “second look,” in that they apply the same standards 
as are applied by the Patent Office prior to grant: 
The Board considers the same statutory requirements 
that the PTO considered when granting the patent. 
Those statutory requirements prevent the “issuance 
of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain.”77 
However, when viewed in context, the quotation from Graham was 
only referring to a constitutional provision for patent and copyright 
protection that was “written against the backdrop of the practices—
eventually curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies—of the Crown in 
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which 
had long before been enjoyed by the public.”78 The Court in Graham 
stated that, under our Constitution, 
[t]he Congress in the exercise of the patent power 
may not overreach the restraints imposed by the 
stated constitutional purpose. Nor may it enlarge the 
patent monopoly without regard to the innovation, 
advancement or social benefit gained thereby.  
Moreover, Congress may not authorize the issuance 
of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free 
access to materials already available.79 
 
75 Id. 
76 Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966). 
77 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (quoting Graham, 383 U.S. at 6) (citation omitted). 
78 Graham, 383 U.S. at 5. The constitutional provision was Art. I, section 8, clause 8 
which, as quoted by the Court, “authorizes the Congress ‘To promote the Progress of . . . 
useful Arts, by securing for Limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . 
Discoveries,’” and generally is understood to be the basis for the grant of patent rights. 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
79 Graham, 383 U.S. at 5–6 (emphasis added). 
664          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:645 
 
In neither American Bell nor Graham v. John Deere was the 
Court sanctioning, as suggested by Justice Thomas, legislative 
measures that claw back statutory patent rights once granted. Rather, 
the Courts in both American Bell and Graham prohibited legislation 
that would confer patent rights embracing subject matter previously 
in the public domain, and granted standing to the government to 
challenge granted patents only in Article III courts and only in cases 
of “fraud and deceit” and ministerial error. 
2. Justice Gorsuch’s Dissenting View 
Justice Gorsuch in his dissent to Oil States rightly pointed out 
that the issues addressed in McCormick80 were independent of any 
statutory provisions in force, either at the time of those cases or now, 
under the AIA.81 Consistent with Justice Gorsuch’s view, the Court 
in American Bell asserted that the right of the government to rescind 
a patent obtained by fraud or deceit was not superseded by a statu-
tory provision under the Patent Act of 1870, namely § 4920 of the 
Revised Statutes, providing a defense to infringement.82 As stated 
by the Court in American Bell: 
 
80 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609 (1898) (citations 
omitted); see also supra text accompanying note 72. The decision by the Court in 
McCormick was directed to the ability of a patentee to abandon an application for reissue 
and regain the original patent from the Patent Office. 
81 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“The Court today replies that 
McCormick sought only to interpret certain statutes then in force, not the Constitution. But 
this much is hard to see.”). 
82 Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 61, 16 Stat. 198–217 (July 8, 1870) (repealed 1952), 
Rev. § 4920 (emphasis added): 
That in any action for infringement the defendant may plead the 
general issue, and having given notice in writing to the plaintiff or his 
attorney, thirty days before, may prove on trial any one or more of the 
following special matters — 
First. That for the purpose of deceiving the public the description and 
specification filed by the patentee in the patent office was made to 
contain less than the whole truth relative to his invention or discovery, 
or more than is necessary to produce the desired effect; or 
Second. That he had surreptitiously or unjustly obtained the patent for 
that which was in fact invented by another, who was using reasonable 
diligence in adapting and perfecting the same; or, 
Third. That it had been patented or described in some printed 
publication prior to his supposed invention or discovery thereof; or, 
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It is, therefore, urged that because each individual  
affected by the monopoly of the patent is at liberty, 
when he is sued for using it without license or  
authority, to set up these defenses, the remedy which 
the United States has, under the principles we have 
attempted to sustain, is superseded by that fact. But  
a consideration of the nature and effect of these  
different modes of proceeding in regard to the patent 
will show that no such purpose can be inferred from 
these clauses of the act of Congress.83 
To the contrary, the Court in American Bell viewed “the argu-
ment that [§ 4920] was intended to supersede affirmative relief  
to which the United States is entitled . . . is not sound.”84 For Jus-
tice Gorsuch, “[a]llowing the Executive to withdraw a patent, 
McCormick said, ‘would be to deprive the applicant of his property 
without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the 
judicial branch of the government by the executive.’”85 The Court 
 
Fourth. That he was not the original and first inventor or discovered of 
any material and substantial part of the thing patented; or, 
Fifth. That it had been in public use or on sale in this country for more 
than two years before his application for a patent, or had been 
abandoned to the public. 
And in notices as to proof of previous invention, knowledge, or use of 
the thing patented, the defendant shall state the names of patentees and 
the dates of their patents, and when granted, and the names and 
residences of the persons alleged to have invented, or to have had the 
prior knowledge of the thing patented, and where and by whom it had 
been used; and if any one or more of the special matters alleged shall 
be found for the defendant, judgment shall be rendered for him with 
costs. And the like defenses may be pleaded in any suit in equity for 
relief against an alleged infringement; and proofs of the same may be 
given upon like notice in the answer of the defendant, and with the like 
effect. 
83 United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 372 (1888). 
84 Id. at 373. 
85 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1384 (Gorsuch J., dissenting) (quoting McCormick, 169 U.S. 
at 612). Specifically, the Court in McCormick stated: 
[T]o attempt to cancel a patent upon an application for reissue when 
the first patent is considered invalid by the examiner would be to 
deprive the applicant of his property without due process of law, and 
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in American Bell explained that “it would be a strange anomaly” for 
a “government which separates the powers to be exercised by its 
executive, its legislative, and its judicial branches” to conclude that 
in the judiciary “there should be no remedy for such a wrong,” 
namely, the “practice of a gross fraud upon the United States.”86 In 
essence, the Court in American Bell was stating that the constitu-
tionality of the government’s actions are not affected by legislation 
that may be in effect at any given time. 
Justice Thomas, therefore, could not logically dismiss Supreme 
Court precedent regarding the constitutionality of an executive 
power to thereby strike down granted patents simply on the basis 
that legislation in force at the time of that precedent no longer is in 
effect. The primary issue in Oil States was the constitutionality of 
IPRs under Article III of the Constitution and, as stated by Justice 
Gorsuch, there is no indication that the holding in McCormick was 
affected by any statutory provision, but instead collectively affirmed 
 
would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the government 
by the executive. 
*** 
Upon application being made for such reissue the patent office was 
authorized to deal with all its claims, the originals as well as those 
inserted first in the application, and might declare them to be invalid, 
but such action would not affect the claims of the original patent, which 
remained in full force, if the application for a reissue were rejected or 
abandoned. 
McCormick, 169 U.S. at 612.  
86 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 357–58. The Court in American Bell put the constitutional 
issue as follows: 
Though, by the constitution of the United States, it is declared that ‘the 
judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under their authority,’ and ‘to controversies to 
which the United States shall be a party,’ the argument asserts that the 
practice of a gross fraud upon the United States, concerning matters of 
immense pecuniary value, and affecting a very large part of its 
population, is not a proper question of judicial cognizance. It would be 
a strange anomaly in a government organized upon a system which 
rigidly separates the powers to be exercised by its executive, its 
legislative, and its judicial branches, and which in this emphatic 
language defines the jurisdiction of the judicial department, to hold 
that in that department there should be no remedy for such a wrong. 
Id. 
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and limited the power of the government (i.e., the Patent Office) to 
rescind a granted patent of its own accord consequent to fraud and 
deceit.87 The holding in McCormick was, therefore, independent of 
any legislation by Congress, and made clear that the executive 
branch had no power to revoke a granted patent except in limited 
cases. Specifically, the Court in McCormick, relying, in part, on 
American Bell, stated: 
It has been settled by repeated decisions of this court 
that when a patent has received the signature of the 
secretary of the interior, countersigned by the com-
missioner of patents, and has had affixed to it the seal 
of the patent office, it has passed beyond the control 
and jurisdiction of that office, and is not subject to be 
revoked or canceled by the president, or any other 
officer of the government . . . . It has become the 
property of the patentee, and as such is entitled to the 
same legal protection as other property.88 
To establish properly that these “precedents are best read as  
a description of the statutory scheme that existed at that time,”  
Justice Thomas would have had to provide more than a temporal 
link between the Patent Act of 1870 and the holdings by the  
 
87 Id. at 373 (“There is nothing in these provisions expressing an intention of limiting 
the power of the government of the United States to get rid of a patent obtained by fraud 
and deceit . . . .”). The Court in McCormick further stated: 
In Peck v. Collins, 103 U.S. 660, an application for reissue made under 
the laws in force in 1866 was held to absolutely extinguish the original 
patent. Subsequent to that time the law of 1870, of which Rev. St. § 
4916, forms a part, was passed. 
*** 
[T]he expression of opinion in Peck v. Collins, relied upon by the 
defendants, must be considered merely a dictum, and lacking the force 
of a judicial determination. 
*** 
Our conclusion upon the whole case is that, upon the issue of the 
original patent, the  patent office had no power to revoke, cancel, or 
annul it. It had lost jurisdiction over it, and did not regain such 
jurisdiction by the application for a reissue. 
169 U.S. at 610–12. 
88 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 608–09 (citing U.S. v. Schurz, 102 U.S. 378 (1880); Seymour 
v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516 (1870)). 
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Court in cases such as American Bell and McCormick.89 This,  
Justice Thomas did not do. 
3. The Effect of Recent Precedent—Cuozzo Speed 
Technologies, LLC v. Lee 
The Court in Oil States also relied on a recent decision, Cuozzo 
Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee, for the proposition that “[p]atent 
claims are granted subject to the qualification that the PTO has ‘the 
authority to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim’ in an 
inter partes review,”90 and quoted an earlier case, Crowell v.  
Benson, to conclude that “[p]atents thus remain ‘subject to [the 
Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside an Article III court.”91  
Interestingly, the Court in Cuozzo was not referring to inter partes 
review in the passage that was recited by Justice Thomas in Oil 
States, but rather, to reexaminations, namely ex parte reexamination 
and inter partes reexamination,92 statutory proceedings that were en-
acted in 1980 and 1999,93 respectively, incidentally implying a par-
allel with inter partes review. More to the point, however, the Court 
in Cuozzo did not address the permissibility of IPRs as a whole. Ra-
ther, the issues in Cuozzo were limited to the appealability of a de-
cision to institute inter partes review and the authority under the AIA 
to decide the standard for claim construction to be applied during 
 
89 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1376. 
90 Id. at 1374 (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)). 
91 Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). 
92 See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2137. The Court stated: 
For several decades, the Patent Office has also possessed the authority 
to reexamine—and perhaps cancel—a patent claim that it had 
previously allowed. In 1980, for example, Congress enacted a statute 
providing for “ex parte examination.” 
* * * 
In 1999 and 2002 Congress enacted statutes that established another, 
similar procedure, known as “inter partes reexamination.” 
Id. 
93 See Patent and Trademark Law Amendments (Bayh-Dole) Act, Pub. L. 96-517, ch. 
30, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018)); see also American 
Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–19) (replaced with inter partes review (IPR) by the AIA). 
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inter partes review.94 Other than cases dating back to the nineteenth 
century with respect to reissue,95 the constitutionality of post-grant 
examination of patents has never been addressed.96 
Likewise, the language from Crowell was mischaracterized in 
that the Court there said nothing about granted patents or a “Board.” 
 
94 See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2136. The Court quoted the relevant portions of the AIA 
when laying out the issues and respective holdings on appeal: 
We consider two provisions of the [Leahy–Smith America Invents 
Act]. The first says: 
“No Appeal—The determination by the Director [of the Patent 
Office] whether to institute an inter partes review under this 
section shall be final and non-appealable.” § 314(d). 
Does this provision bar a court from considering whether the Patent 
Office wrongly “determin[ed] . . . to institute an inter partes review,” 
ibid., when it did so on grounds not specifically mentioned in a third 
party’s review request? 
The second provision grants the Patent Office the authority to issue: 
“regulations . . . establishing and governing inter partes review 
under this chapter.” § 316(a)(4). 
Does this provision authorize the Patent Office to issue a regulation 
stating that the agency, in inter partes review, 
“shall [construe a patent claim according to] its broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the specification of the patent 
in which it appears?” 37 CFR § 42.100(b) (2015). 
We conclude that the first provision, though it may not bar 
consideration of a constitutional question for example, does bar 
judicial review of the kind of mine-run claims at issue here, involving 
the Patent Office’s decision to institute inter partes review. We also 
conclude that the second provision authorizes the Patent Office to issue 
the regulation before us. 
Id. 
95 See, e.g., McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898); 
see also supra text accompanying note 80. 
96 By way of contrast, interference proceedings, which existed even before the first 
patent act, address only priority of a claimed invention and, regardless, require that one of 
the parties be a patent applicant before the Patent Office. Even then only a “final judgment 
adverse to a patentee from which no appeal or other review has been or can be taken or had 
shall constitute cancellation of the claims involved in the patent.” Patent Act of 1952, Pub. 
L. 593, § 135, 66 Stat. 792, 802 (1952). As stated by P.J. Federico in his commentary on 
the 1952 Patent Act, “[t]he last sentence of the first paragraph [of Section 135] provides 
that a final judgment adverse to a patentee, subject to appeal or other review provided, 
constitutes cancellation of the claims involved from the patent.” P.J. Federico, Commentary 
on the New Patent Act, 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 198 (1993); see also 
G. Reilly, The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Cancellation, 23 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 377, 387–88 (2017). The author is unaware that the constitutionality of this 
portion of 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) has ever been challenged. 
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The complete sentence from which the Court in Oil States drew the 
language quoted from Crowell had a much different meaning than 
simply a reservation by the Patent Office “to cancel [patents] outside 
of an Article III court.”97 Rather, the phrase “subject to [the Board’s] 
authority”98 was derived from language in Crowell that, in fact, sup-
ported a position contrary to the dismissal of private rights in patents 
asserted by the majority in Oil States: 
As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at  
once apparent between cases of private right and 
those which arise between the government and  
persons subject to its authority in connection with the 
performance of the constitutional functions of the  
executive or legislative departments.99 
More specifically, the Court in Crowell was referring to a distinction 
between “public” and “private” rights, and based distinction  
between them on a much earlier decision by the Court regarding land 
patents: 
The [Supreme] Court referred to this distinction in 
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Company . . . , pointing out that “there are matters, 
involving public rights, which may be presented in 
such form that the judicial power is capable of acting 
on them, and which are susceptible of judicial deter-
mination, but which congress may or may not bring 
within the cognizance of the courts of the United 
States, as it may deem proper.”100 
This is not a blanket assertion that patents are subject to a broad 
power of cancellation by the Patent Office, as purported by the Court 
in Oil States. Rather, the sentence only speaks to “public rights,” 
which “arise between the government and persons subject to its  
 
97 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 
(2018) (“Patents thus remain ‘subject to [the Board’s] authority’ to cancel outside of an 
Article III court.”) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)). 
98 Id. at 1374. 
99 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added). 
100 Id. (quoting Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 
284 (1855)) (emphasis added). 
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authority.”101 The sentence says nothing about the authority of the 
Patent Office, in general, or the “Board,” in particular, to cancel any 
granted patent rights. 
The issue in Crowell was not about patents of invention, nor 
even land patents but, instead, liability for damages consequent to 
injury suffered by an employee while “performing service upon the 
navigable waters of the United States.”102
 
For the Court in Crowell, 
“[t]he present case does not fall within the categories just described, 
but is one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to 
another under the law as defined.”103 The larger significance of 
Crowell was not any categorical exposure of granted patents to  
cancellation “outside of an Article III court,” as suggested by Justice 
Thomas in Oil States.104 To the contrary, the Court in Crowell  
distinguished between “legislative courts” involving “public rights,” 
and “constitutional courts,” which have the sole authority to decide 
“private rights.”105 As recited above, the Court in Crowell under-
stood cases of private rights to address “the liability of one individ-
ual to another under the law as defined,”106 while cases of “public 
rights” were those that “arose between the government and persons 
subject to its authority in connection with the performance of the 
constitutional functions of the executive or legislative depart-
ments.”107 As we shall see, patents are private rights that are vested 
upon grant of a patent and, therefore, only patent applicants, not  
patentees, are properly subject to government authority “in connec-
tion with the performance of the constitutional functions of the  
executive or legislative departments.”108 
C. Patents as “Franchises” 
The majority opinion in Oil States relied heavily on characteri-
zation of patents as “franchises” to link the exclusionary rights of 
 
101 Id. (emphasis added).  
102 Id. at 36. 
103 Id. at 51. 
104 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1374 
(2018). 
105 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50. 
106 Id. at 51. 
107 Id. at 50 (emphasis added). 
108 Id; see also supra text accompanying note 99. 
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granted patents to “public rights,” thereby making them subject to 
legislative discretion, such as by creating non-Article III post-grant 
proceedings administered by the PTO. Part II.C.1 briefly surveys the 
historical application of the term “franchise” to patents. Part II.C.2 
analyzes the evolution of the term “franchise” as a function of “pub-
lic interest” in the midst of antitrust concerns during the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, and Part II.C.3 concludes that 
characterization of “patents” as “franchises” became progressively 
inapt with refinement of their respective meanings at the end of the 
twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. 
1. Use of the Term “Franchise” to Define Patents 
The Court in Oil States viewed the grant of patents to be at the 
discretion of the Patent Office within, of course, the bounds of  
positive law. Justice Thomas drew a parallel between congressional 
reservation of authority to “revoke or amend” patents and other 
so-called “franchises,” such as those that, historically, have been 
employed to authorize companies to construct bridges, railroads, 
and telegraph lines.109 
Such a characterization might be useful if patents were well- 
established as franchises, and if franchises were well-defined, but 
neither is the case. The word “franchise” is employed only sporadi-
cally by nineteenth-century writers of the major treatises on patent 
law. For example, except in the context of the “privileges of the 
cirque ports, the nursery of the English navy,” granted by King  
John in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, Collier110
 
and Godson111 
make no mention of patents as franchises, instead variously referring 
to them as “monopolies,” “privileges,” and “contracts.”112 Likewise, 
 
109 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1375 (“For example, Congress can grant a franchise that 
permits a company to erect a toll bridge, but qualify the grant by reserving its authority to 
revoke or amend the franchise . . . . The same is true for franchises that permit companies 
to build railroads or telegraph lines.”) (citing Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 
U.S. 409, 421 (1917); United States v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 1, 24–25, 37–38 
(1895)). 
110 See generally JOHN DYER COLLIER, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW 
INVENTIONS (2d ed. 1803). 
111 See generally RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT (1823). 
112 COLLIER, supra note 110, at 26; GODSON, supra note 111, at 44. 
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Phillips113 makes no mention of the word, nor do Hindmarch114 or 
Curtis.115 Robinson states unequivocally that use of the term “fran-
chise” by the Court in American Bell and in another case, Attorney 
General v. Rumford Chemical Works,116 is error: 
The judges, in the two cases [American Bell and 
Rumford] now examined, repudiate all similarity  
between a patent for an invention and a land grant, 
and identify it with a franchise both in nature and  
effect. This is obviously an error. The issue of a  
patent does not confer a simple franchise; it creates a 
monopoly. Although the government and the public 
do not own the invention, they do possess rights  
in reference to it of the most important character, 
which are suspended or relinquished by the grant of  
letters-patent . . . . If this question [of government 
rights over patents] is to be determined by analogy it 
is thus evident that the doctrine applied to land 
grants, and not that to franchises, must furnish us 
with the desired solution.117 
 
113 See generally WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS, 1837: 
INCLUDING THE REMEDIES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS 
(1837). 
114 See generally W. M. HINDMARCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO PATENT 
PRIVILEGES FOR THE SOLE USE OF INVENTIONS (1846). 
115 See generally GREG TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR 
USEFUL INVENTIONS (3d ed. 1867). 
116 See Attorney Gen. ex rel. Hecker v. Rumford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608 (C.C. D.R.I. 
1876). 
117 2 WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 468, 473, 
474 n.1 (1890) (emphasis added). 
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Courts variously have distinguished and interchanged as syno-
nymous the terms “monopoly” and “franchise” throughout Ameri-
can legal history.118 In Bloomer v. McQuewan,119 for example, the 
Supreme Court, when distinguishing between the “grant of the right 
to make and vend the machine, and the grant of the right to use it”120 
in the context of patents, used “monopoly” and “franchise” as syn-
onymous terms: 
The franchise which the patent grants, consists  
altogether in the right to exclude everyone from  
making, using, or vending the thing patented, with-
out the permission of the patentee. This is all that  
he obtains by the patent. And when he sells the  
exclusive privilege of making or vending it for use in 
a particular place, the purchaser buys a portion of the 
franchise which the patent confers. He obtains a 
share in the monopoly, and that monopoly is derived 
from, and exercised under, the protection of the 
United States.121 
Howsoever characterized, the Court in Bloomer stated that the  
exclusionary right expires upon sale: 
But the purchaser of the implement or machine for 
the purpose of using it in the ordinary pursuits of life, 
stands on different ground. In using it, he exercises 
no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does he 
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive 
 
118 See, e.g., BRUCE W. BUGBEE, THE GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT 
LAW 6 (1967). Bugbee stated: 
Patents of invention have been variously designated privileges, 
monopolies, and franchises . . . . In the nineteenth century, United 
States patents of invention were sometimes called “franchises,” and 
this word has also been employed more recently. With true impartiality 
the Supreme Court of the United States even used “special privilege,” 
“monopoly,” and “franchise” interchangeably in a patent decision of 
1852. 
Id. (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533–34 (1870); United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. 
United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–51 
(1852)). 
119 Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 539. 
120 Id. at 549. 
121 Id. (emphasis added). 
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privilege granted to the patentee. . . . And when the 
machine passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no 
longer within the limits of the monopoly.122 
There is, therefore, according to the Court in Bloomer, a distinction 
between the exclusionary right to make, use, and sell under a patent 
franchise, which may be apportioned, and the right to use conse-
quent to purchase of protected subject matter, which is apart from 
that exclusionary right. There is, however, no parsing of meaning 
between the terms “franchise” and “monopoly” under which the 
right to make, use, and sell can be apportioned. 
By way of contrast, in Seymour v. Osborne,123 which was de-
cided just eighteen years after Bloomer and cited by Justice Thomas 
in Oil States,124 the Court clearly distinguished between monopolies 
and franchises, relying on purported differences in the source of au-
thority and the nature of exclusive rights. The Court in Seymour 
stated: 
Letters patent are not to be regarded as monopolies, 
created by the executive authority at the expense and 
to the prejudice of all the community except the  
persons therein named as patentees, but as public 
franchises granted to the inventors of new and useful 
improvements for the purpose of securing to them,  
as such inventors, for the limited term therein  
mentioned, the exclusive right and liberty to make 
and use and vend to others to be used their own  
inventions, as tending to promote the progress of  
science and the useful arts, and as matter of compen-
sation to the inventors for their labor, toil, and  
expense in making the inventions, and reducing the 
 
122 Id. (emphasis added). 
123 78 U.S. at 516. 
124 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 
(2018) (“Specifically, patents are ‘public franchises’ that the Government grants ‘to the 
inventors of new and useful improvements.’”) (citing Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533). 
676          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:645 
 
same to practice for the public benefit, as contem-
plated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the laws 
of Congress.125 
The Court in Seymour, therefore, viewed the distinction between 
“monopolies” and “public franchises” as a difference in the effect of 
the exclusive right on the community, wherein monopolies operate 
“at the expense and to the prejudice of all the community except the 
persons therein named as patentees.”126 Public franchises, on the 
other hand, functioned as “compensation to the inventors” in  
exchange for reducing their inventions to practice “for the public 
benefit, as contemplated by the Constitution and sanctioned by the 
laws of Congress.”127 
Nevertheless, the Court in Seymour also stated that “[i]nventions 
secured by letters patent are property in the holder of the patent, and 
as such are as much entitled to protection as any other property,  
consisting of a franchise, during the term for which the franchise or 
the exclusive right is granted.”128 All of this, however, was dicta in 
that the issue in Seymour was whether a patentee was entitled to an 
injunction for activities conducted during an extension of patent 
term by a party that had taken a license on that patent during its 
original term.129 The holding of the Court did not hinge on whether 
the behavior of the patentee acted to the “prejudice of all the com-
munity” or “for the public benefit.” 
In 1888, the Court in California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co. 
referred to franchises as a “right of eminent domain [that] can only 
be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant.”130 Examples of fran-
chises given by the Court included “a public highway or a public 
ferry or railroad,” or the right to “charge tolls for the use of the 
 
125 Seymour, 78 U.S. at 533–34 (emphasis added). 
126 Id. at 533. 
127 Id. at 533–34. 
128 Id. at 533. 
129 Id. at 534, 560 (“[T]he reissued patents were fully extended for seven years from the 
expiration of the original term . . . . For these reasons we are all of the opinion that the 
complainants are entitled to a decree that their several patents are valid, and for an account 
and for a perpetual injunction, except as to such, if any, as have expired.”). 
130 California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1888). 
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same.”131 The Court saw a franchise as a grant of exclusive use of 
property already in the public domain: 
No private person can establish a public highway or 
a public ferry or railroad, or charge tolls for the use 
of the same, without authority from the legislature, 
direct or derived. These are franchises. No private 
person can take another’s property, even for a public 
use, without such authority; which is the same as to 
say that the right of eminent domain can only be  
exercised by virtue of a legislative grant. This is  
a franchise.132 
A patent for an invention does not fit this model. Rather, a patent for 
an invention is only put into the public domain by the inventor in 
exchange for a grant, or with the prospect of grant of a patent from 
the government.133
 
In other words, inventions are not pre-existing 
property of the government to which exclusive rights can be granted. 
They are, instead, creations that are disclosed to the public in  
exchange for (at least the prospect of) being granted an exclusive 
right to make, use, and sell for a limited period of time. If franchises 
are grants of exclusive rights to governmentally-held public prop-
erty, then patents are not franchises. 
2. Public Interest in Patent Rights—Protecting Against 
Restraint of Trade 
Late in the nineteenth century, rapid industrialization in the 
United States prompted legislation to mitigate restraint of trade con-
sequent to competition in large markets among relatively few play-
ers.134 Inevitably, the exclusionary rights associated with patents  
became linked to efforts to regulate competition, such as the  
 
131 Id. at 40. 
132 Id. at 40–41 (emphasis added). 
133 American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 
Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2018)) required all U.S. non-provisional 
patent applications to be published eighteen months from their filing date, with a few 
exceptions, regardless of whether a U.S. patent ultimately issued. 
134 See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7); 
Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 
12–27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53); Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 73, 28 Stat. 
570. 
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Sherman Act of 1890, ultimately touching upon fundamental con-
cepts underlying patent rights.135 An early example can be found in 
a decision by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, 
namely National Harrow Co. v. Hench, in 1897, which stated that 
“[p]atents confer a monopoly as respects the property covered by 
them, but they confer no right upon the owners of several distinct 
patents to combine for the purpose of restraining competition and 
trade.”136 Therefore, antitrust laws would, presumably, generally  
apply to manipulation of patents, at least in combination with  
each other. 
On the other hand, in 1907, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit, in Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber 
Works Co., specifically asserted that the Sherman Antitrust Act did 
not implicate the monopoly of patent rights: 
The Sherman law contains no reference to the patent 
law. Each was passed under a separate and distinct 
constitutional grant of power; each has passed  
professedly to advantage the public; the necessary 
implication is not that one iota was taken away from 
the patent law; the necessary implication is that  
patented articles, unless or until they are released by 
the owner of the patent from the dominion of his  
monopoly, are not articles of trade or commerce 
among the several states.137 
The patentee’s choice to withhold use of the subject matter of  
a granted patent from the public, as viewed in Seymour,138
 
can be 
compared with the Court’s view in Continental Paper Bag Co. v. 
Eastern Paper Bag Co.139 There, unlike the Court in Seymour, the 
Supreme Court seemed to endorse a monopolistic characterization 
of patents: 
 
135 See, e.g., E.S. Meyers & S.D. Lewis, The Patent “Franchise” and the Antitrust Laws, 
30 GEO. L.J. 117 (1941). 
136 Nat’l Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 F. 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1897) (emphasis added). 
137 See Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works, 154 F. 358, 362 (7th Cir. 
1907) (emphasis added). 
138 See supra text accompanying note 125. 
139 Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908). 
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As to the suggestion that competitors were excluded 
from the use of the new patent, we answer that such 
exclusion may be said to have been of the very  
essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is 
the privilege of any owner of property to use or not 
use it, without question of motive.140 
However, like the Court in Seymour, the Court in Continental  
Paper Bag also appeared equivocal about the absolute nature of  
exclusivity, and even to qualify that characterization in that,  
“regarding the situation of the parties in view of the public interest, 
[whether] a court of equity might be justified in withholding relief 
by injunction, we do not decide.”141 
Something at least like “public interest” was inferred by the  
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts just one year later, in 
Blount Manufacturing. Co. v. Yale & Towne Manufacturing. Co.,142 
which stated that “[t]he equitable status of an owner of a patent who 
has purchased and held it in nonuse for this purpose is still an open 
question, and was not determined by the Paper Bag Patent Case.”143 
The court, then, went on to specifically deny that the Sherman Act 
was inapplicable to patentees’ exclusionary rights: 
An attempt to make profit out of letters patent by  
suppressing the invention covered thereby is outside 
the patent grant, and is so far removed from the spirit 
and intent of the patent law that the mere fact that  
an inventor may make a profit by suppressing his  
invention is not a sufficient reason for holding the 
Sherman act inapplicable to agreements affecting  
patented articles . . . . To prohibit contracts for the 
suppression or restraint of his own trade by the  
application of the Sherman anti-trust act is not  
 
140 Id. at 429. 
141 Id. at 430 (“Whether, however, as [sic] case cannot arise where, regarding the situation 
of the parties in view of the public interest, a court of equity might be justified in 
withholding relief by injunction, we do not decide.”) (emphasis added). 
142 166 F. 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909). 
143 Id. at 560. 
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inconsistent with his right to manufacture, use, and 
vend.144 
The court ultimately held that the Sherman Act applied, at least as 
to “combinations between owners of independent patents”: 
Combinations between owners of independent  
patents, whereby, as part of a plan to monopolize the 
commercial field, competition is eliminated, are 
within the Sherman act, for the reason that the  
restraint of trade or monopoly arises from combina-
tion, and not from the exercise of rights granted by 
letters patent. As by the terms of the contracts under 
consideration the owners of distinct patents each 
agreed to restrain its own interstate trade, I am of the 
opinion that the contracts are in these particulars  
obnoxious to the Sherman anti-trust act.145 
In 1912 the Supreme Court again weighed in, in Standard  
Sanitary Manufacturing. Co. v. United States, concluding that 
“[r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive, 
but they do not give any more than other rights a universal license 
against positive prohibitions. The Sherman law is a limitation of 
rights, rights which may be pushed to evil consequences, and there-
fore restrained.”146 As exemplified by application of the Sherman 
Act, at least, the “public interest” identified by Continental Paper 
Bag147 operated to limit the capacity of patent holders to coopera-
tively manipulate the market and thereby treat patents as monopolies 
that operate “at the expense and to the prejudice of all the commu-
nity except the persons therein named as patentees” as proscribed by 
the Supreme Court in Seymour.148 
 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 562 (emphasis added). 
146 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912). 
147 See supra text accompanying notes 139–141. 
148 See supra text accompanying notes 125–129. 
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3. Broadening “Public Interest” Against Patents as 
“Franchises” Beyond Restraint of Trade 
Just ten years after Standard Sanitary Manufacturing. Co., the 
Court, in United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. United States,149 relied on 
Bloomer to unmoor use of the term “franchise” from an exclusionary 
grant of rights to property otherwise publicly owned, as suggested 
by the Court in Central Pacific Railroad,150 to cover a broad statu-
tory right of exclusivity that accompanies any granted patent, 
thereby apparently cementing equivalence of the terms “franchise” 
and “monopoly.”151 The Court in United Shoe stated: 
From an early day it has been held by this court  
that the franchise secured by a patent consists only  
in the right to exclude others from making, using,  
or vending the thing patented without the permission 
of the patentee, Bloomer v. McQuewan, 14 How. 
539.152 
Thereafter, courts continued to characterize patents as fran-
chises, but only sporadically so, and inconsistently relative to the 
meaning of “monopoly.” For example, in Picard v. United Aircraft 
Corp.,153 Circuit Judge Frank, concurring with a majority opinion 
penned by Judge Hand, equated monopolies and franchises.154  
More explicitly than did the majority in Blount,155 Judge Frank  
invoked “public interest” to ask rhetorically about the permissibility 
of nonuse: 
It is surely questionable, then, whether the control of 
our industrial development, so far as it is exercised 
through patents, should be left solely to patentees; as 
the public interest is deeply involved, it would seem 
wise that representatives of the public should at least 
participate in decisions of any such matters. For  
 
149 United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922). 
150 See supra text accompanying note 132. 
151 See supra text accompanying notes 119–122. 
152 United Shoe, 258 U.S. at 463 (citing Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539 (1852) 
(emphasis added)). 
153 128 F.2d 632, 645 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J., concurring). 
154 Id. at 645. 
155 See supra text accompanying notes 143–145. 
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patents are governmentally created monopolies. The 
Supreme Court has called them ‘public franchises,’ 
granted by the government, acting on behalf of  
the public.156 
However, Circuit Judge Frank questioned any comparison of  
patents, as franchises, to public utilities, over which the government 
has control: 
It is, accordingly, appropriate to ask whether the 
holder of such a public franchise should be permit-
ted, without any governmental control whatever, to 
decide that no public use should be made of the  
franchise during its life or only such public use as the 
franchise-holder, in its utterly unregulated discretion, 
deems wise, and at such prices as it sees fit to exact. 
We accord no such powers to the holder of a public 
franchise to run a bus line or to sell electric power.157 
He appears to answer this question in the affirmative, using the  
example of compulsory licensing to suggest that government inter-
ference would likely slow investment in new technology: 
Accordingly, the suggestion—recently endorsed in 
an editorial in so conservative a newspaper as the 
New York Times—that all patentees be required to 
grant licenses to others on reasonable terms might, 
unless qualified, seriously retard industrial progress: 
A provision for universal compulsory licenses may 
do no harm—perhaps it will do much good—to  
inventors, but may tend to frighten off extensive  
investment in new patents which will induce compe-
tition with the giant industrials.158 
Much later, in 1991, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, in Borre v. United States,159 invoked California v. Central  
 
156 Picard, 128 F. 2d at 645 (Frank, J., concurring) (citing Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 
516, 533 (1870) (emphasis added)). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 643. 
159 940 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1991). 
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Pacific Railroad Co.160 to distinguish franchises as rights “previ-
ously held exclusively by sovereign,” such as a “[cable television] 
franchise,” which constitutes “a delegation of a governmental  
function to private entities to be performed in the furtherance of the 
public welfare . . . .”161 However, in 1998 the Supreme Court in 
Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc.162 returned to a broader definition 
that embraced patents, blending and confusing use of the terms 
“franchise” and “monopoly.” The Court stated that, “the patent sys-
tem represents a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the 
creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in  
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period 
of time.”163 But, then, immediately after having stated that patents 
were “monopolies,” the Court in Pfaff quoted Seymour v. Osborne 
to the opposite effect: “Letters patent are not to be regarded as  
monopolies . . . but as public franchises granted to the inventors of 
new and useful improvements . . . .”164 
In 2000, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in Semi-
conductor Energy Laboratory Co. v. Samsung Electronics Co.,165 
also in reliance on California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co.,166  
referred to a franchise as a “transfer of extant rights previously held 
exclusively by the sovereign.”167 The Court referenced Borre168  
to cite examples such as “cable television and public utilities.”169 
Expanding on these precedents, the court asserted that a patent,  
instead, is a right “to exclude a party from practicing a particular 
 
160 Id. at 220 (“[F]ranchise involves transfer of rights previously held by the sovereign.”) 
(citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888)). 
161 Id. (citing 1 D. FERRIS, F. LLOYD & T. CASEY, CABLE TELEVISION LAW § 13.13, at § 
13-68.11 (1990)). 
162 525 U.S. 55 (1998). 
163 Id. at 63 (emphasis added). 
164 Id. (quoting Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870)). 
165 204 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2000); see also supra text accompanying note 66. 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 130–132. 
167 Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380 (citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 
1, 40 (1888)). 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 159–161. 
169 Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380 (citing Borre v. United States, 940 F.2d 215, 220 
(7th Cir. 1991)). 
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invention [that] is never held by the sovereign, but only by the  
patentee after issuance.”170 
Therefore, while patents have been referred to as “franchises” in 
the past, use of this term has never been consistent. More generally, 
the meaning of “franchise,” other than as a right to control certain 
commercial activities previously held by the government, is so 
broad as to render this term essentially useless as judicial precedent 
for any purpose. This is especially so when applied to the scope and 
character of granted patent rights, at least as they are to be under-
stood in the context of separation of powers under Articles I, II, and 
III of the Constitution. 
D. Patent Validity and Separation of Powers Under Article III 
The nature of “public rights,” as admitted by Justice Thomas, 
has never been “definitively explained.”171 Unlike “franchise,” the 
meaning of which remained diffuse, use of the term “public rights” 
became increasingly fractious during the twentieth century. Part 
II.D.1 will look at the applicability of precedent relied upon by Jus-
tice Thomas to characterize patent rights, and Part II.D.2 will ana-
lyze that precedent in the context of public and private interests, and 
the consequent implications for constitutional separation of powers. 
1. Patents as “Public Rights” 
The argument in Oil States that patents are “public rights” relied 
on the late-nineteenth century decision of United States v. Duell.172 
Justice Thomas stated that “[t]his Court has long recognized that  
the grant of a patent is ‘a matte[r] involving public rights,’”173 and 
summarized the granting of a patent as having “the key features to 
fall within this Court’s longstanding formulation of the public-rights 
doctrine.”174 
The Court in Duell held that Congress had the “power to  
authorize the Court of Appeals to review the action of the  
 
170 Id. 
171 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 
(2018) (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)). 
172 172 U.S. 576 (1899). 
173 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (quoting Duell, 172 U.S. at 582–83 (1899)). 
174 Id. 
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Commissioner [of the Patent Office] in an interference case . . . ”175 
The “public rights” at issue were those of the government in the 
course of granting a patent and, more specifically, the authority of 
the judiciary to compel the commissioner of the Patent Office to 
grant a patent to an applicant following an adverse decision in an 
interference proceeding conducted before the Patent Office.176 
Interfering claims, according to the statute in effect at the time 
of Duell (and for patent applications filed before enactment of  
the AIA), were treated differently depending upon whether the  
interference involved a patent application or only the claims of 
granted patents. Contests between interfering patents would be 
heard by courts in equity, whereas only applications that had first 
been refused in an adverse decision by a board of examiners would 
be entitled to such treatment under the Act.177 This suggests that  
legislation addressing the validity of the claims of an issued patent 
was distinct from that addressing claims of a patent application for 
which a patent had not yet been granted. “Public rights,” therefore, 
under Duell, and contrary to Justice Thomas’ understanding of  
Duell, were limited to rights associated with patent applications that 
were not implicated in granted patents.178 
2. “Public Interest” and Separation of Powers Under the 
Constitution 
The decision in Duell turned on the innate nature of the judiciary 
to rule on executive actions affecting private interests. More  
specifically, the issue was whether courts had the power to compel 
compliance by a commissioner of the Patent Office who was  
 
175 Duell, 172 U.S. at 582. 
176 Id. at 586–87. 
177 The Court in Duell was acting under Sections 4915 and 4918 of the Revised Statutes, 
which continued Section 16 of the Act of 1836, wherein, as stated by the Court, “a remedy 
by bill in equity . . . was given as between interfering patents, or whenever an application 
had been refused on an adverse decision of a board of examiners.” Id. at 584. As stated in 
35 U.S.C. § 135(a), which was repealed by the AIA: “Whenever an application is made 
for a patent which, in the opinion of the Director, would interfere with any pending 
applications, or with any unexamined patent, an interference may be declared . . . .” 
(emphasis added). 
178 See also supra text accompanying note 96 for statutory revisions under the Patent Act 
of 1952. 
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refusing to grant a patent in defiance of the lower court. As stated 
by the Court: 
Now in deciding whether a patent shall issue or not, 
the commissioner acts on evidence, finds the facts, 
applies the law, and decides questions affecting  
not only public but private interests; and so as to  
reissue or extension, or on interference between  
contesting claimants; and in all this he exercises  
judicial functions.179 
It was, therefore, the private interest in granted patents that dictated 
the character of actions taken by the commissioner as judicial, and 
“judicial functions” by the commissioner were necessarily appeala-
ble to the judiciary. The Court in Duell stated: 
By the act of February 9, 1893, the determination of 
appeals from the commissioner of patents, which 
was formerly vested in the general term of the  
supreme court of the District, was vested in the court 
of appeals; and, in addition, it was provided that ‘any 
party aggrieved by a decision of the commissioner  
of patents in any interference case may appeal  
therefrom to said court of appeals.’180 
The Court relied on Butterworth v. United States,181 an earlier case, 
which recognized that “in every grant of the limited monopoly [of a  
patent] two interests are involved: that of the public, who are the 
grantors, and that of the patentee.”182 Nevertheless, the Court repeat-
edly stressed the “judicial character” of patent rights, requiring  
compliance with a decision by the courts over a contrary decision 
by an executive officer: 
 
179 Duell, 172 U.S. at 586 (emphasis added). 
180 Id. at 585. 
181 112 U.S. 50 (1884). 
182 Duell, 172 U.S. at 586 (quoting Butterworth, 112 U.S. at 59 (emphasis added)). 
Justice Thomas quoted this language as follows: “As this Court has long recognized, the 
grant of a patent is a matter between ‘the public, who are the grantors, and . . . the 
patentee.’” Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 
1373 (2018) (quoting Duell, 172 U.S. at 586). 
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This court held [in Butterworth] that while the  
commissioner of patents was an executive officer, 
and subject in administrative or executive matters  
to the supervision of the head of the department, yet 
his action in deciding patent cases was essentially  
judicial in its nature and not subject to review by the 
executive head, an appeal to the courts having been 
provided for.183 
The underlying rationale for affirming the lower court mandate that 
the commissioner grant the patent was of “vital importance” in the 
constitutional separation of powers: 
We agree that it is of vital importance that the line  
of demarkation [sic] between the three great depart-
ments of government should be observed, and that 
each should be limited to the exercise of its appro-
priate powers, but in the matter of this appeal we  
find no such encroachment of one department on the 
domain of another as to justify us in holding the act 
in question unconstitutional.184 
Vesting determination of appeals from the commissioner of  
patents in the court of appeals, rather than the head of the executive 
department to which the commissioner of patents reported, was not 
unconstitutional. To the contrary, given the judicial nature of the 
commissioner’s actions, to hold otherwise would, in fact, blur the 
“line of demarkation [sic] between the three great departments of 
government” that is of such “vital importance.”185 The Court in  
Duell, therefore, did not entitle Justice Thomas in Oil States to the 
proposition that “the grant of a patent ‘is a matte[r] involving public 
rights’”186 if that proposition is to extend to jurisdiction by the  
Patent Office over granted patents by virtue of any presumed extant 
public rights following grant. 
 
183 Duell, 172 U.S. at 587 (emphasis added). 
184 Id. at 589. 
185 Id. 
186 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
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III. OIL STATES AND THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT 
Oil States Energy Services, LLC argued in its brief to the  
Supreme Court that, based on the Constitution’s adoption of English 
common law “‘preserv[ing] the right to jury trial as it existed [in 
suits at common law in England] in 1791’” and historical precedent, 
determinations of fact are to be tried before a jury “in actions  
customarily tried to juries in the late 18th century.”187 However,  
the Court took a different view, concluding that “when Congress 
properly assigns a matter to adjudication in a non-Article III  
tribunal, ‘the Seventh Amendment poses no independent bar to the 
adjudication of that action by a nonjury factfinder.’”188 Of course, 
this view begs the question of whether a jury would be required as a 
factfinder if assignment of a matter to a non-Article III tribunal by 
Congress was improper, as this Article proposes.
 
Despite the ambiguous history of a right to jury trial, it is  
clear that while determinations of patent validity were considered 
pursuant to a writ of scire facias in the Kings Privy Council, by 1789 
such actions were being heard in the Court of Chancery, which had 
no provision for a jury.189 However, it would be error to conclude 
that, therefore, patent validity, as a matter of scire facias, was  
an issue of equity rather than common law, and not subject to jury 
trial. Instead, as indicated by Lemley, for example, “[s]cire facias 
actions seem to have been part of the chancery court’s subsidiary  
common-law jurisdiction.”190 Further, Chancery Court “might seek 
the advice of a jury in assessing the facts underlying a scire facias 
petition” by having the “Lord Chancellor deliver the record to the 
King’s Bench for a jury trial and return the verdict to the Chancellor 
 
187 Brief for Petitioner at 78, Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., 
LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018) (No. 16–712), 2017 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3047, at *78 
(quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974)). The petitioner, Oil States, concluded 
that: “No less than wrongfully usurping the role guaranteed to federal courts by Article III, 
inter partes review also usurps the role guaranteed to juries under the Seventh 
Amendment.” Id. at 77. 
188 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1379 (quoting Granfinanciera, SA. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 
53–54 (1989) (emphasis added)). 
189 See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV 
1673, 1684 (2013). 
190 Id. at n.44 (citations omitted). 
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for consideration and judgment.”191 Consequently, even though the 
Supreme Court has now held that issued patents are “public rights,” 
there is substantial support for also holding that there was a common 
law tradition by 1789 in England of judging patent validity by jury 
trial to be continued under the Seventh Amendment, at least as to 
issues of fact. 
IV. THE ROOTS AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICA’S ARTICLE III 
JURISPRUDENCE 
American origins of the distinction between “private” and  
“public” rights must be identified before more recent jurisprudence 
that muddies those concepts can be understood, particularly if those 
concepts are to be applied to modern administrative proceedings, 
such as post-grant examination of granted patents before the Patent  
Office. Part IV.A introduces the origins of the “private” and “pub-
lic” rights in the United States, while Part IV.B walks through more 
recent Supreme Court decisions broadening the scope of jurisdiction 
of private rights to areas that are “seemingly private.” 
A. American Roots of “Private” vs. “Public” Rights 
Article III of the Constitution states that “the judicial Power of 
the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and 
establish,” and that “[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, 
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the 
United States . . . ; [and] to Controversies to which the United States 
shall be a Party . . . .”192 Further, well-established jurisprudence  
dictates that the government cannot be sued without its consent: 
The constitution itself declares that the judicial 
power shall extend to all cases to which the United 
States shall be a party; and that this means mainly 
where it is a party plaintiff [it] is a necessary result 
 
191 Id. at 1685. 
192 U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2. 
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of the well-established proposition that it cannot be 
sued in any court without its consent.193 
The Constitution also provides that the government can set up 
tribunals for adjudication of rights outside Article III. The tribunals 
are a form of court under Article I of the Constitution, which states 
at Section 8, “The Congress shall have Power . . . [9] to constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; . . . .”194 Such tribunals are 
deemed “extra-judicial,” and the reach of such tribunals can hinge 
on the rights at issue as “public rights,” as opposed to “private 
rights,” as first articulated by the Supreme Court in Murray’s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.: 
Though, generally, both public and private wrongs 
are redressed through judicial action, there are  
more summary extra-judicial remedies for both. An  
instance of extra-judicial redress of a private wrong 
is the recapture of goods by their lawful owner; of a 
public wrong, by a private person, is the abatement 
of a public nuisance . . . . 
*** 
To avoid misconstruction upon so grave a subject, 
we think it proper to state that we do not consider 
congress can either withdraw from judicial cogni-
zance any matter which, from its nature, is the  
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or 
admiralty; nor, on the other hand, can it bring under 
the judicial power a matter which, from its nature, is 
not a subject for judicial determination. At the same 
time there are matters, involving public rights, which 
may be presented in such form that the judicial  
power is capable of acting on them, and which are 
susceptible of judicial determination, but which  
congress may or may not bring within the cognizance 
 
193 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888); see also McElrath v. 
United States, 102 U.S. 426, 440 (1880) (“The government cannot be sued, except with its 
own consent.”). 
194 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9. 
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of the courts of the United States, as it may  
deem proper.195 
The Supreme Court in Crowell v. Benson relied on the distinction 
between “public” and “private rights” in Murray’s Lessee to parse 
the proper roles of respective “legislative” and “constitutional” 
courts, at least “as to determinations of fact”: 
As to determinations of fact, the distinction is at once 
apparent between cases of private right and those  
between the government and persons subject to its 
authority in connection with the performance of  
the constitutional functions of the executive or  
legislative departments [i.e., “public rights”].  
The Court referred to this distinction in Murray’s 
Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Com-
pany . . . . Thus the Congress, in enacting the powers 
confided to it, may establish “legislative” courts (as 
distinguished from “constitutional courts in which 
the judicial power conferred by the Constitution can 
be deposited”) . . . to serve as special tribunals “to 
examine and determine various matters, arising  
between the government and others, which from their 
nature do not require judicial determination yet are 
susceptible of it.”196 
The Court in Ex parte Bakelite clearly stated the limits of  
authority for each of “constitutional courts” and “legislative courts”: 
But there is a difference between the two classes of 
courts. Those established under the specific power 
given in section 2 of [A]rticle 3 are called constitu-
tional courts. They share in the exercise of the  
judicial power defined in that section, [which] can be 
invested in no other jurisdiction . . . . On the other 
hand, those created by Congress in the exertion of 
 
195 Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 283–84 
(1855) (emphasis added). 
196 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50–51 (1932) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 
U.S. 511 (1828); Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929) (emphasis added)). 
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other powers are called legislative courts. Their func-
tions always are directed to the execution of one or 
more of such powers, and are prescribed by Congress 
independently of section 2 of [A]rticle 3 . . . .197 
“Legislative courts” could also function in an “adjunct” capacity  
under Article III courts, as stated by the Supreme Court in Atlas 
Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission: 
In cases which do involve only “private rights,” this 
Court has accepted fact-finding by an administrative 
agency, without intervention by a jury, only as an ad-
junct to an Art. III court, analogizing the agency to  
a jury or a special master and permitting it in admi-
ralty cases to perform the function of the special mas-
ter.198 
In a plurality decision, and with reference to Crowell, the  
Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon 
Pipe Line Co. stated that “this Court has sustained the use of adjunct 
factfinders even in the adjudication of constitutional rights,” but that 
the “functions of the adjunct must be limited in such a way that ‘the 
essential attributes’ of judicial power are retained in the Art. III 
court.”199 Among the “essential attributes” of judicial power that 
cannot be conferred upon an “adjunct” Article I court, according to 
the Court in Northern Pipeline, was issuance of “final judgments, 
which are binding and enforceable even in the absence of appeal.”200 
Rather, any decision by an “adjunct court” could be offered only in 
an advisory capacity, and was subject to de novo review.201 
Overall, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline identified three 
forums where “Art. III does not bar the creation of legislative 
courts” under Article I. They are: “territorial courts,” which are 
 
197 Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. at 449 (emphasis added). 
198 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
450 n.7 (1977) (emphasis added). 
199 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 78–81 (1982) (citing 
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51, 54). 
200 Id. at 85–86. 
201 See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S 833, 853 (1986) 
(“The legal rulings of the CFTC [Commodity Futures Trading Commission], like the legal 
determinations of the agency in Crowell, are subject to de novo review.”). 
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“‘created in virtue of the general right of sovereignty which exists 
in the government’”; “courts-martial”; and “public rights.”202 While 
acknowledging that “the distinction between public rights and  
private rights has not been definitively explained by our prece-
dents,” the Court in Northern Pipeline found that “it suffices to  
observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise  
‘between the government and others.’”203 
B. Expanding the Authority of Article I Courts to Adjudicate 
“Seemingly” Private Rights 
The Supreme Court broadened the permissible scope of legisla-
tive courts in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products 
Co.204 There, the Court could not agree to the appellee’s assertion 
that the Courts in Northern Pipeline and Crowell established that 
“the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal  
Government is a party of record.”205 Rather, Justice O’Connor, for 
the majority, held that “Congress, acting for a valid legislative  
purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may 
create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a 
public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency 
resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”206 
A year later, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor, the majority opinion, also written by Justice O’Connor, 
stated that, moreover, consent by the government or any other  
party was not dispositive of the boundaries between government 
branches: 
To the extent that this structural principle [of checks 
and balances among federal branches of the govern-
ment] is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot 
by consent cure the constitutional difficulty for the 
 
202 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64–67, 70 (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 
511, 546 (1828)). 
203 Id. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)). 
204 See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985). 
205 Id. at 586 (“Insofar as appellees interpret that case [Northern Pipeline] and Crowell 
as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal 
Government is a party of record, we cannot agree.”). 
206 Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added). 
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same reason that the parties by consent cannot confer 
on federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction beyond 
the limitations imposed by Article III, § 2. When 
these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of 
consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because  
the limitations serve institutional interests that the 
parties cannot be expected to protect.207 
Instead, Justice O’Connor laid out four factors to be considered in 
deciding constitutionally permissible limitations on Article III juris-
prudence: 
[1] [T]he extent to which the “essential attributes of 
judicial power” are reserved to Article III courts, 
and, conversely, [2] the extent to which the non- 
Article III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction 
and powers normally vested only in Article III 
courts, [3] the origins and importance of the right  
to be adjudicated, and [4] the concerns that drove  
Congress to depart from the requirements of  
Article III.208 
None of the factors were “deemed determinative, [but, rather,  
were viewed] with an eye to the practical effect that the congres-
sional action will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the  
federal judiciary.”209 
Combination of these factors with denial that the government 
must be a party of record in any Article I proceeding has led to con-
troversy. For example, in the Supreme Court case of Granfinanciera 
S.A. v. Nordberg, Justice Brennan for the majority relied on Thomas 
to conclude that “the Federal Government need not be a party for a 
case to revolve around ‘public rights.’”210 Justice Scalia, concurring 
in part and concurring in judgment, however, was emphatic that 
“[t]he notion that the power to adjudicate a legal controversy  
 
207 Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850–51 (1986). 
208 Id. at 851 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 
81 (1982) (emphasis added)). 
209 Id. 
210 Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989) (quoting Thomas v. Union 
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985)). 
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between two private parties may be assigned to a non-Article III, yet 
federal, tribunal is entirely inconsistent with the origins of public 
rights doctrine.”211 According to Justice Scalia, the Court in Thomas 
improperly broadened the “public rights doctrine” announced in 
Murray’s Lessee beyond “rights of the public—that is, rights  
pertaining to claims brought by or against the United States.”212 For 
Justice Scalia, “[w]aiver of sovereign immunity can only be impli-
cated, of course, in suits where the Government is a party.”213  
“Public rights,” as a waiver of the general rule of government  
immunity, was replaced by the Court in Thomas, in Justice Scalia’s 
view, “by sheer force of our office,”214 with “‘simply a pragmatic 
understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method 
of resolving matters that “could be conclusively determined by the 
Executive and Legislative Branches,” the danger of encroaching on 
the judicial powers is reduced.’”215 As a result, according to  
Justice Scalia, the Court in Thomas held “for the first time, that  
a purely private federally created action did not require Article III 
courts.”216 This was, for Justice Scalia, “too much.”217 Justice  
Scalia stated: 
I do not think one can preserve a system of separation 
of powers on the basis of such intuitive judgments 
regarding “practical effects,” . . . . This central  
feature [of separation of powers] of the Constitution 
must be anchored in rules, not set adrift in some  
multifactored “balancing test”–and especially not in 
a test that contains as its last and most revealing  
 
211 Id. at 66 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
212 Id. at 68. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 69. 
215 Id. (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. at 589) (quoting 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 68 (1982)). 
216 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 69 (emphasis added). 
217 Id. at 69–70 (explaining that in Thomas, “‘[p]ragmatic understanding’ was all that 
counted,” but stating that “in a case-by-case evaluation of whether the danger of 
‘encroaching’ on the ‘judicial powers’ (a phrase now drained of constant content) [this] is 
too much.”). 
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factor “the concerns that drove Congress to depart 
from the requirements of Article III.”218 
Nevertheless, since that time the number of “factors” have  
accumulated, further aggravating the difficulty of administering  
Justice O’Connor’s “balancing test.”219 For example, the Court in 
Stern v. Marshall relied on a variety of factors to conclude that the 
plaintiff’s “claimed right to relief does not flow from a federal  
statutory scheme, as in Thomas or Atlas Roofing.”220 The Court held 
that the Bankruptcy Court, under the Bankruptcy Court Act of 1984, 
“lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a 
state law counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling 
on a creditor’s proof of claim.”221 The Court cautioned, however, 
that “[g]iven the extent to which this case is so markedly distinct 
from the agency cases discussing the public rights exception in the 
context of such a regime, . . . we do not in this opinion express any 
view on how the doctrine might apply in that different context.”222 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia counted “at least seven different 
reasons given in the Court’s opinion for concluding that an  
Article III judge was required to adjudicate this lawsuit . . . .”223  
Justice Scalia stated that “[t]he multifactors relied upon today seem 
to have entered our jurisprudence almost randomly,” and concluded 
that, “in my view an Article III judge is required in all federal adju-
dications, unless there is a firmly established historical practice to 
the contrary.”224 
On the basis of this jurisprudence, and the confusing effect of 
having to consider multiple factors in a “balancing test” to assess the 
necessity of the government being a party to a contest over “public 
rights,” the better view may be to assume that, if the government is 
not a party to a lawsuit, then the right at issue is inherently private 
and that, therefore, adjudication, but for findings of fact by an  
 
218 Id. at 70 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S 833, 851 
(1986) (emphasis added)). 
219 Id. (referring to Justice O’Connor’s four factors cited in Schor). 
220 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 493 (2011). 
221 Id. at 503. 
222 Id. at 494 (emphasis added). 
223 Id. at 504 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
224 Id. at 504–05. 
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adjunct court, should be limited to “constitutional” courts  
established under Article III. 
One example is post-grant examination of patents, such as by 
IPR. As discussed in Section III above, there is ample basis for  
concluding that, but for the conclusion in Oil States that patents are 
“public rights,” determinations of fact respecting patent validity 
might be subject to Seventh Amendment protection. Arguably, 
IPRs, and other forms of post-grant patent examination instituted  
by third parties,` are not “public rights” because they are disputes  
between private parties, namely, between the patent owner and a 
private third party who is not the government. Then, consistent with 
the practice of Chancery Court at the time the U.S. Constitution was 
adopted, a trial court could “seek the advice of a jury in assessing 
the facts” underlying a question of patent validity. Even so, as  
asserted in Atlas Roofing, an administrative agency, such as the  
Patent Office, can be employed for “fact finding . . . , without inter-
vention by a jury, [but] only as an adjunct to an Art. III court.”225 
An Article I tribunal, such as the PTAB of the Patent Office, 
under this view, should only be able to operate as an adjunct to a 
district court, and then only in an advisory capacity as to issues  
of fact. 
V. ARTICLE III JURISPRUDENCE AS APPLIED TO PATENTS OF 
INVENTION 
Just as the distinction between private and public rights has 
evolved with the growth and development of American administra-
tive law, so too have popular notions of the reach of administrative  
bodies over those rights, along with the introduction of new tools, 
such as reexamination proceedings in 1980 and now IPRs, PGRs, 
and CBMs with enactment of the AIA. Article I jurisdiction over  
“seemingly private rights,” combined with the unresolved nature of 
patent rights, has pitted ideas about public and private interests in 
patents against each other. Part V.A reviews historical limits on the 
government’s ability to invalidate issued patents. Part V.B attempts 
 
225 Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 
450 n.7 (1977); see also supra text accompanying note 198. 
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to identify the competing interests in patents that have led to confu-
sion over the legitimate roles of “legislative” and “constitutional” 
courts, and Part V.C proposes a solution to the dilemma posed by 
perceived conflicting goals of patent protection. 
A. Historical Limits on the Government’s Ability to Invalidate 
Issued Patents 
As suggested by Justice Gorsuch in Oil States,226 Justice 
Thomas’ dismissal of the bulk of nineteenth century jurisprudence 
regarding patents as private rights was fatal to his argument that 
IPRs do not violate due process of law under the Constitution.227 To 
reiterate, and expand on the above summary of Justice Gorsuch’s 
dissenting opinion, there is, in fact, well-established historical  
precedent that clearly precludes the government from being a party 
to a determination of patent validity. As discussed above,228 in 
McCormick Harvesting Machinery Co. v. Aultman, decided in 1898, 
the Supreme Court stated that, upon issuance, a patent has “become 
the property of the patentee,” and, therefore, an attempt to cancel an 
issued patent by an examiner “would be to deprive the applicant  
of his property without due process of law, and would be in fact  
an invasion of the judicial branch of the government by the execu-
tive.”229 While the court in McCormick upheld statutory provisions 
for reissue proceedings,230 it was because such proceedings required 
that the patentee voluntarily surrender the patent. As stated by  
the Court: 
If the patentee abandoned his application for reissue, 
he is entitled to a return of his original patent  
precisely as it stood when such application was 
made, and the patent office has no greater authority 
 
226 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
227 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
228 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
229 McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 169 U.S. 606, 609, 612 (1898). 
230 “Reissue” is a proceeding before the Patent Office that was originally established 
under the Patent Act of 1832, and is intended to correct patents that are considered wholly 
or partly invalid. In the Patent Act of 1870, reissue required surrender of the original patent 
to take effect. 4A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS: A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 15.02[5] (2019). 
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to mutilate it by rejecting any of its claims than it has 
to cancel the entire patent.231 
A year later, in 1899, the Court in United States v. Duell,232  
as discussed above, held that determination of validity of claimed 
subject matter prior to grant of an issued patent was a matter of 
“public rights,” thereby entitling the legislative branch to remove, at 
its discretion, what would otherwise be subject to Article III  
review.233 This is consistent with McCormick and decisions by the 
Supreme Court that limited such public rights to patent applications. 
Moreover, treatment of letters patents generally—namely land  
patents and patents for invention—in the United States did not nec-
essarily follow from practice in England. For example, the Court in 
United States v. American Bell234 expressly dismissed reliance on 
scire facias235 proceedings, whereby letters patent could be invali-
dated at the prerogative of the King236:   
We have no king in this country; we have here no 
prerogative of the crown; and letters patent, whether 
for inventions or for grants of land, issue not from the 
president but from the United States. The president 
has no prerogative in the matter . . . . The patent, 
then, . . . is not subject to be repealed or revoked by 
the president, the secretary of the interior, or the 
commissioner of patents, when once issued.237 
The reason for distinguishing between pre- and post-grant was 
stated broadly as a “rule” in Michigan Lumber v. Rust238: “[W]her-
ever the granting act specifically provides for the issue of a patent, 
then the rule is that the legal title remains in the government until 
 
231 McCormick, 169 U.S. at 610. 
232 See United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576 (1899). 
233 Id. at 583; see also supra notes 172–178 and accompanying text. 
234 United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888). 
235 Latin for “make known.” See Scire Facias, DICTIONARY, https://www.dictionary.com/
browse/scire-facias [https://perma.cc/WKM9-ZVXK]. 
236 See HELEN GUBBY, DEVELOPING A LEGAL PARADIGM FOR PATENTS 20 (2012) (“If a 
patent were to be declared void officially, it had to be annulled by the crown on a writ of 
scire facias.”). 
237 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 362–63. 
238 168 U.S. 589 (1897). 
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the issue of the patent.”239 The policy behind the rule, at least with 
respect to land patents, was made clear twenty years earlier, in 
Moore v. Robbins240: 
‘A patent,’ says the court in United States v. Stone, 
‘is the highest evidence of title, and is conclusive 
against the government and all claiming under junior 
patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled  
by some judicial tribunal. In England, this was  
originally done by scire facias; but a bill in chancery 
is found a more convenient remedy.’ 
*** 
But in all this [in the United States] there is no place 
for the further control of the Executive Department 
over the title . . . . He [the President] is absolutely 
without authority. If this were not so, the titles  
derived from the United States, instead of being the 
safe and assured evidence of ownership which they 
are generally supposed to be, would be always sub-
ject to the fluctuating, and in many cases unreliable, 
action of the land-office. 
*** 
The existence of any such power in the Land  
Department is utterly inconsistent with the universal 
principle on which the right of private property is 
founded.241 
Arguably, the same reasoning can be applied to patents of inven-
tion and the Patent Office, particularly in view of the parallel often 
drawn between land patents and patents of invention, as expressed 
by the Supreme Court in American Bell: 
The power, therefore, to issue a patent for an inven-
tion, and the authority to issue such an instrument for 
a grant of land, emanate from the same source; and, 
although exercised by different bureaus or officers 
 
239 Id. at 593 (citation omitted). 
240 96 U.S. 530 (1877). 
241 Id. at 533–34 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S. v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864)). 
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under the government, are of the same nature,  
character, and validity, and imply in each case the 
exercise of the power of the government according 
to modes regulated by acts of congress.242 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has only acknowledged a limited scope 
for the Patent Office to exercise authority over title after a patent has 
been granted. Exceptions to the Executive Department’s general 
lack of power over patents exist where there is “fraud in the  
patentee,” as discussed above,243 or where patents are “issued unad-
visedly or by mistake, or where the officer has no authority in law 
to grant them, or where another party has a higher equity, and should 
have received the patent.”244 In such cases, “the right of the United 
States to interfere . . . is its obligation to protect the public from the 
monopoly of the patent which was procured” by those means.245 
Even so, and as also discussed above,246 the Supreme Court in Amer-
ican Bell affirmed only “the power of the government of the United 
States to get rid of a patent [that was] obtained from it by fraud and 
deceit,” despite an act by the legislature to give “private individuals 
a more limited form of relief, by way of defense to an action by the 
patentee.”247 
B. Private Rights vs. Protection of the Public 
A dilemma, therefore, appears in the nature of private property 
that would ban the government from unilaterally withdrawing a 
grant of patent without being a party to any challenge to its validity, 
but would nevertheless seem to involve an interest by the govern-
ment in protecting the public from patents improperly granted.  
Resolution can be found in the nature of proceedings authorized by 
Congress to address issues of fraud by the patentee, mistake by the 
Patent Office, and “higher equity” among inventors. In other words, 
while a limited exclusionary right to inventions is granted by the 
Constitution, Congress has defined the manner in which patents are 
 
242 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 358–59. 
243 See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
244 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 365. 
245 Id. at 367. 
246 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
247 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 373. 
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to be granted. On one hand, if a granted patent is private property, it 
is protected by the Judiciary under Article III of the Constitution. 
On the other hand, the legislative and executive branches are 
charged with protecting the public’s legitimate interest against  
mistakes made by the granting authority, which is the Patent Office. 
Referring back to Northern Pipeline,248 bankruptcy courts under 
the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 were declared unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court because, even though designated “adjunct” courts, 
they issued “final judgments, which are binding and enforceable 
even in the absence of an appeal.”249 Accordingly, they could exer-
cise “jurisdiction behind the façade of a grant to the district courts, 
and are exercising powers far greater than those lodged in the  
adjuncts approved in . . . either Crowell” or another Supreme Court 
Case, United States v. Raddatz.250 The Court in Northern Pipeline 
viewed Crowell and Raddatz as recognizing the “delicate accommo-
dations required by the principle of separation of powers reflected 
in Art. III”251 that limited the powers of an adjunct court, at least in 
bankruptcy proceedings, by: 
(1) making “only specialized, narrowly confined 
factual determinations regarding a parti-
cularized area of law”; 
(2) engaging in “statutorily channeled fact-finding 
functions”; 
(3) possession of “only a limited power to issue . . . 
orders pursuant to specialized procedures”; 
(4) susceptibility to having such orders “set aside 
if ‘not supported by the evidence,’” instead of 
“the more deferential ‘clearly erroneous’ 
standard”; and 
(5) enforcement enabled only by order of a district 
court.252 
 
248 See supra notes 199–203 and accompanying text. 
249 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 85–86 (1982). 
250 Id. at 86 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932); United States v. Raddatz, 447 
U.S. 667 (1980)). 
251 Id. at 83. 
252 Id. at 85. 
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In Northern Pipeline, the Court distinguished between “rights 
created by Congress and other rights,” including “a critical differ-
ence between rights created by federal statute and rights recognized 
by the Constitution.”253 If “the right being adjudicated is not of  
congressional creation,”254 then: 
[S]ubstantial inroads into functions that have tradi-
tionally been performed by the Judiciary cannot be 
characterized merely as incidental extensions of 
Congress’ power to define rights that it has created. 
Rather, such inroads suggest unwarranted encroach-
ments upon the judicial power of the United States, 
which our Constitution reserves for Art. III courts.255 
In the case of Northern Pipeline, for example, the claims involved 
rights created by state law, “independent of and antecedent to the 
reorganization petition that conferred jurisdiction upon the  
Bankruptcy Court.”256 The Court, therefore, upheld the District 
Court decision dismissing a suit for breach of contract in a United 
States bankruptcy court on the ground that the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978, by reaching rights created by state law, was unconstitutional 
under Article III.257 
If patents of invention ultimately are deemed to be “recognized 
by the Constitution,” such as by virtue of Article I, Section 8, Clause 
8, which states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o promote  
the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . 
inventors the exclusive right to their . . . Discoveries,”258 and if those 
exclusive rights are ultimately held to be “private rights,” those 
rights would be protected by the Constitution under the Fifth 
Amendment, which states: 
 
253 Id. at 83 (emphasis added). 
254 Id. at 84. 
255 Id. (emphasis added). 
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 88. 
258 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
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No person shall be . . . deprived of . . . property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation.259 
Following the reasoning of Northern Pipeline, legislative acts that 
make “substantial inroads” into functions affecting the validity of 
granted patents, activities that traditionally have been within the  
exclusive purview of the Judiciary, constitute “unwarranted  
encroachments upon the judicial power of the United States, which 
our Constitution reserves for Article III courts.”260 Moreover, as  
the Supreme Court indicated in Williams v. United States, such acts 
would be contrary to the well-established doctrine prohibiting Con-
gress from depositing judicial power in legislative (non-Article III) 
courts: 
[W]here a controversy is of such a character as to  
require the exercise of the judicial power defined by 
[A]rticle 3, jurisdiction thereof can be conferred only 
on courts established in virtue of that [A]rticle, and 
that Congress is without power to vest that judicial 
power in any other judicial tribunal, or, of course, in 
an executive officer, or administrative or executive 
board, since, to repeat the language of Chief Justice 
Marshall in American Insurance Company et al. v. 
Canter, . . . “they are incapable of receiving it.”261 
Therefore, establishment of any tribunal empowered to retract  
exclusive rights secured in granted patents would “far exceed the 
powers that it has vested in administrative agencies that adjudicate 
only rights of Congress’ own creation.”262 
 
259 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
260 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84. 
261 Williams v. United States, 282 U.S. 553, 578 (1933) (quoting Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 
26 U.S. 511, 546 (1828)). 
262 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 84. 
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C. Resolution of Competing Private and Public Interests in 
Patents, and Recent Decisions by the Federal Circuit 
If patent rights are private, and broad authority of the Board is 
an unnecessary encroachment, then resolution can be found in limi-
tation of post-issuance review of patent rights by the PTAB to the 
guidelines set forth in Northern Pipeline.263 Guidelines for the 
Board should be “statutorily defined,” enabling possession of “only 
a limited power to issue . . . orders pursuant to specialized proce-
dures” and enforceable only by a district court, which would set 
aside any such order if “not supported by the evidence.”264 To ignore 
these limiting principles would, as stated by the Court in Northern 
Pipeline, 
require that we replace the principles delineated in 
our precedents, rooted in history and the Constitu-
tion, with a rule of broad legislative discretion that 
could effectively eviscerate the constitutional guar-
antee of an independent Judicial Branch of the  
Federal Government.265 
Again operating on the assumption that patent rights are pri- 
vate, such “evisceration” may, in fact, have already been the  
consequence, at least with respect to patents of invention, in MCM  
Portfolio LLC. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., where the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit recently held that “patent rights are public 
rights, and their validity susceptible to review by an administrative 
agency.”266 The Court based its decision on earlier lower court  
decisions that were only tangentially associated with Article III, and 
distinguished certain Supreme Court precedent. For example,  
according to the Federal Circuit in MCM Portfolio, McCormick was 
limited to reissue proceedings, which held only that, “[w]ithout  
statutory authorization,” cancellation of a patent without surrender 
of the patent by the patent owner would be a deprivation of due  
 
263 Id. at 85; see also supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
264 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85. 
265 Id. at 74. 
266 MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
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process of law.267 The Federal Circuit concluded that McCormick 
“did not address Article III and certainly did not forbid Congress 
from granting the PTO the authority to correct or cancel an issued 
patent,”268 and relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Thomas 
that Congress “‘may create a seemingly “private” right that is so 
closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter 
appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the 
Article III judiciary.’”269 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern was 
also quoted, stating that “public rights doctrine [can apply] to dis-
putes between private parties” where “the claim at issue derives 
from a federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim 
by an expert government agency is deemed essential to the limited 
regulatory objective within the agency’s authority.”270 The Federal 
Circuit deemed “the PTO . . . ‘an executive agency with specific  
authority and expertise’ in the patent law,” and stated that “[i]t 
would be odd indeed if Congress could not authorize the PTO to 
reconsider its own decisions.”271 
The court in MCM Portfolio drew a parallel with reexamination 
proceedings, which are available to “any person” who can establish, 
on the basis of lack of novelty, under 35 U.S.C. § 102, or obvious-
ness, under 35 U.S.C. § 103, a “substantial new question of patent-
ability.”272 The Federal Circuit decisions of Joy Technologies v. 
 
267 Id. at 1289 (“Without statutory authorization, an ‘attempt [by the Commissioner of 
Patents] to cancel a patent upon an application for reissue when the first patent is 
considered invalid by the examiner . . . would be to deprive the applicant of his property 
without due process of law, and would be in fact an invasion of the judicial branch of the 
government by the executive.’”) (quoting McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Aultman, 
169 U.S. 606, 612 (1898)). The Court in MCM Portfolio also cited American Bell “noting 
lack of statutory authority for the Patent Office to cancel patents.” Id. (citing United States 
v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 364–65 (1888)). 
268 MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289. 
269 Id. at 1290 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593–
94 (1985) (emphasis added)). 
270 Id. at 1290 (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 490 (2011)). 
271 Id. at 1290–91 (quoting Kappos v. Hyatt, 566 U.S. 431 (2012)). 
272 35 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). After enactment of the AIA only ex parte reexamination is 
available. From 1999 to 2011, another alternative, inter partes reexamination, which 
allowed greater participation by third parties beyond petitioning for reexamination, was 
available under 35 U.S.C. § 311. The AIA ended inter partes reexamination. See 2601 
Introduction [R-07.2015], U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2601.html [https://perma.cc/438N-F4VH]. 
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Manbeck273 and Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff 274 were, for the court 
in MCM Portfolio, “controlling authority” for the proposition that 
inter partes review, like reexamination in Joy and Patlex, does not 
violate Article III because “the issuance of a valid patent is primarily 
a public concern and involves a ‘right that can only be conferred by 
the government’ even though validity often is brought into question 
in disputes between private parties.”275 The inference by the Court 
in MCM Portfolio was that issued patents are a concern that involves 
a “public right.” The Court in Joy was even move direct, stating that 
“[n]othing in Granfinanciera . . . casts doubt on the Patlex court’s 
holding that a valid patent involves public rights,”276 and further 
concluded that they “need not reach Joy’s argument that it was  
deprived of private rights.”277 However, the Federal Circuit in  
Patlex did not explicitly say that patents were “public rights,” but 
instead invoked only “favored treatment from the courts” toward 
“curative statutes” based on the Supreme Court decision of Graham 
& Foster v. Goodcell that hinged legislative intervention to cure 
“mistake of officers purporting to administer the law in the name of 
the Government” on a “lack of substantial equity” in an “asserted 
vested right.”278 
Further, and contrary to the contention of the Federal Circuit  
in MCM Portfolio, the McCormick court did not imply that the  
capacity of the PTO to “correct or cancel” a patent was simply a 
function of “statutory authorization.”279 Moreover, it would not 
make sense for the Court in McCormick, nor in American Bell for 
that matter, to do so because the result would leave the doctrine of 
 
273 Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
274 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 595 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
275 MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1291 (quoting Joy, 959 F.2d at 228). 
276 Joy, 959 F.2d at 229. 
277 Id. 
278 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603 (quoting Graham & Foster v. Goodcell, 282 U.S. 409, 429 
(1931)). The Court in Graham stated: 
Where the asserted vested right, not being linked to any substantial 
equity, arises from the mistake of officers purporting to administer the 
law in the name of the Government, the legislature is not prevented 
from curing the defect in administration simply because the effect may 
be to destroy causes of action which would otherwise exist. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
279 MCM Portfolio, 812 F.3d at 1289. 
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separation of powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches solely to the discretion of the legislative branch—a clear 
misunderstanding of this fundamental concept. It should also be 
noted that neither Thomas nor Stern involved the grant of patent 
rights and, therefore, did not recognize the well-established premise 
asserted in Stone that a “patent is the highest evidence of title, and 
is conclusive as against the Government, and all claiming under  
junior patents or titles, until it is set aside or annulled by some  
judicial tribunal.”280 
While acknowledging that patents are “property,” and that  
patent owners have a Fifth Amendment right to due process, Judge 
Newman in Patlex stopped short of calling patents “public rights” 
and cited no Supreme Court authority for that proposition. Rather, 
Judge Newman concluded only that patents are a “public concern” 
that justified the “overriding public purpose” of “curative stat-
utes.”281 Following the policy of “favorable treatment” indicated by 
the Court in Graham toward “curative statutes,” the “overriding 
public purpose” was given “great weight” by the district court and 
by the Federal Circuit in Patlex, and the Federal Circuit determined 
that Congress did not act in an arbitrary and irrational way to achieve 
its desired purposes.282 Significantly, for our purposes, the relevant  
legislative history of reexamination proceedings that constituted the 
“overriding public purpose,” as summarized by the Federal Circuit 
in Patlex, included, as one component, the expertise of the Patent 
 
280 United States v. Stone, 69 U.S. 525, 535 (1864); see also supra note 71 and accomp-
anying text. 
281 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603–04. 
282 Id. The court in Patlex stated: 
We conclude, as did the district court, that the overriding public 
purposes Congress articulated in enacting the reexamination law with 
retroactive effect are entitled to great weight, and that Congress did 
not act in an arbitrary and irrational way to achieve its desired 
purposes. We affirm the district court in upholding the validity of the 
retroactive [reexamination] statute against Gould’s challenge under the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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Office, as “‘an aid’ to the trial court ‘in making an informed deci-
sion on the patent’s validity.’”283 This language is consistent with 
contribution by the Patent Office as a fact-finding adjunct to an  
Article III district court, as discussed above. 
Generally, however, reexamination is conducted at the Patent 
Office according to “procedures established for initial examina-
tion.”284 Appeal from a decision by the PTAB is to the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,285 and in the absence of appeal 
the judgment of the PTAB is enforceable. Therefore, contrary to the 
statement made by the Federal Circuit in Patlex, there is no “trial 
court” to be aided by reexamination, unless either the PTAB, which 
is part of the Patent Office under the Department of Commerce,  
or the Federal Circuit, which is a court of appeals, is to be so con-
sidered. Recognition of this discrepancy should have nullified the 
“great weight” the Federal Circuit allotted to any “overriding pur-
pose” behind “enacting the reexamination law.”286 
Overall, the Federal Circuit in MCM Portfolio did not rely on 
Supreme Court authority for the assertion that granted patents of 
invention are “public rights.” Other than Oil States, no such author-
ity exists to date. Even Patlex and Joy, both of which are lower  
appeals court decisions, did not conclude that patents are “public 
rights.” The court in Patlex instead opted for the “public purpose of 
the improved administration of law” without regard for the “vested 
 
283 Id. at 602 (quoting Patent Reexamination Hearings, supra note 32) (emphasis added). 
Specifically, as recited by the court in Patlex: 
The bill’s proponents foresaw three principal benefits. First, the new 
procedure could settle validity disputes more quickly and less 
expensively than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases. 
Second, the procedure would allow courts to refer patent validity 
questions to the expertise of the Patent Office. See Senate Hearings at 
1, wherein Senator Bayh said that reexamination would be “an aid” to 
the trial court “in making an informed decision on the patent’s 
validity.” Third, reexamination would reinforce “investor confidence 
in the certainty of patent rights” by affording the PTO a broader 
opportunity to review “doubtful patents.” 126 Cong. Rec. 29,895 
(1980) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). 
Id. (emphasis added). 
284 35 U.S.C. § 305. 
285 See id. §§ 306, 141(b). 
286 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 603; see also supra note 282 and accompanying text. 
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right” that is linked to the “substantial equity” conferred by the grant 
of a patent,287 going no further than to conclude that patents are “pri-
marily a public concern.”288 The court in Joy, in turn, perfunctorily 
demurred to Patlex as controlling authority,289 but inferred, as did 
the Patlex court, that a “patent involves public rights.”290 
The conclusion by MCM Portfolio that “patent rights are public 
rights” is not a correct interpretation of Patlex, which the court then 
held up as binding precedent. However, even if the absence of MCM 
Portfolio had limited its understanding of Patlex to an assertion  
that patents are a “public concern,” the “great weight” granted by 
Patlex to favor “curative statutes” to thereby achieve an “overriding  
purpose” of “substantial equity” is misguided. “Curative statutes” 
should not be given deference based on intent. Rather, a clear un-
derstanding of constitutional separation of powers must be applied 
to analyze the mechanics and effect of any new legislation in order 
to assess whether or not that legislation is, in fact, “curative.” 
VI. DOUBLE JEOPARDY: PATENTS AS CONTRACTS AND THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OVERLAPPING UNILATERAL REVOCATION 
BY THE GOVERNMENT 
Patents have been considered contracts since the eighteenth cen-
tury when, in England, the requirement to work an invention for the 
public good, made in exchange for an exclusive right as a matter of 
judicial favor, or privilege, was substituted with a contractual right 
to exclude in consideration for public disclosure of how to practice 
that invention. This transition is the basis for modern jurisprudence 
in patent law, and failure to incorporate the resulting distinction in 
recent post-grant examination proceedings puts patentees in double 
jeopardy of losing those rights, contrary to the motivation behind 
this legislation. Part VI.A is an analysis of patents as contracts. Part 
VI.B establishes an affirmative link between inter partes review and 
 
287 See supra note 278 and accompanying text. 
288 Patlex, 758 F.2d at 604. 
289 Joy Techs., Inc. v. Manbeck, 959 F.2d 226, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“Because Patlex is 
controlling authority and has not been impaired by either of the subsequent Supreme Court 
cases cited by Joy, we reject Joy’s attack on that decision.”). 
290 Id. 
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its older cousin, ex parte reexamination, and explores some prob-
lems consequent to post grant examination in a non-Article III  
tribunal. Part VI.C is a general plea for reconsideration of all post- 
grant patent examination proceedings that are available to “a person 
who is not the owner of the patent,” as called for by the statutory 
provision for IPRs.291 
A. Patents as “Contracts” 
Regardless of whether patents are considered to be public or pri-
vate rights, monopolies, franchises, or property, it is generally 
agreed that they are contracts between the Government and the  
patentee. Justice Gorsuch alluded to the contractual nature of patents 
in his dissent in Oil States, and to the continuity of that understand-
ing as patents transitioned from “little more than feudal favors”292 
judged by the King’s Privy Council, to “procompetitive means to 
secure to individuals the fruits of their labor and ingenuity”293 that 
were to be “adjudicated solely by the law courts” thereafter.294  
Justice Gorsuch quoted Walterscheid to suggest that the U.S.  
Constitution adopted this revised view: 
The Constitution itself reflects this new thinking,  
authorizing the issuance of patents precisely because 
of their contribution to the “Progress of Science and 
useful Arts.” Art. 1 § 8, cl. 8. “In essence, there was 
a change in perception—from viewing a patent as  
a contract between the crown and the patentee to 
viewing it as a ‘social contract’ between the patentee 
and society.”295 
 
291 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (“Subject to the provisions of this chapter, a person who is not the 
owner of a patent may file with the Office a petition to institute an inter partes review of 
the patent.”). 
292 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1382 
(2018) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
293 Id. 
294 Id. (quoting Adam Mossoff, Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual 
History, 1550–1800, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1258, 1286–87 (2001)). 
295 Id. (quoting Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the United States Patent 
Law: Antecedents (Part 3), 77 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 771, 793 (1995)). 
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“Society” is, of course, represented by the government within the 
framework of the “social contract.”296 
Contracts then, as now, presume some kind of consideration, 
even if that contract is with the government.297 For patents, that con-
sideration, both in England and in colonial America, typically was a 
requirement to work the invention.298 By the late eighteenth century, 
however, the requirement to work an invention was replaced  
by a requirement that the inventor disclose the invention to the  
 
296 See supra note 237 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Am. Bell Tel. 
Co., 128 U.S. 315, 362–63 (1888) (“We have no king in this country; we have here no 
prerogative right of the crown . . . . The patent, then . . . is not subject to be repealed or 
revoked by the president, the secretary of the interior, or the commissioner of patents, when 
once issued.”). 
297 See, e.g., W.J. Kelly, The Concept of Consideration in Government Contracts, 10 
U.S.A.F. JAG L. REV. 20, 20 (1968) (“All contracts require consideration and Government 
contracts no less than those between private parties must be supported by consideration to 
be valid and enforcible [sic].”) (citing Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 
489 (1922); William Atwater & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 495 (1922)). 
298 CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT 
SYSTEM, 1660–1800, at 12 (1988) (“Patentees were required to implement their ‘invention’ 
without delay and ensure its continuance by communicating the necessary skills to native 
workmen. The grant was revocable if these conditions were not met.”); see also Edward C. 
Walterscheid, The Early Evolution of the U.S. Patent Law: Antecedents (5, Part II), 78 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y, 665, 670 (1996). Waterscheid quotes a patent granted by 
New York in 1780 to Henry Guest: 
Provided nevertheless that the grant hereby made shall not take effect 
until the said Henry Guest shall have filed in the secretary’s office in 
this State, a writing containing the names and description of the 
materials aforesaid, and the method and process of making such 
blubber and oyl, or a substitute of blubber and oyl; nor until the said 
Henry Guest shall have a manufactory erected for the purpose, and 
shall have made such blubber or oyl, of the materials aforesaid, within 
this State. 
Id. (quoting 1 Laws of the State of New York (Albany 1886–87) at 277–78). 
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public.299 In the United States, since the Patent Act of 1790, patent-
ees were required to describe their invention300 and, with only some  
 
299 H.I. DUTTON, THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 1750–1852, at 22 (1984): 
The final justification for patents was the exchange-for-secrets thesis, 
or the disclosure agreement. It was based on the eighteenth-century 
idea of contract, where society and the inventor made a bargain, one 
offering temporary protection, the other knowledge of new techniques.  
This rationale had its origins in the Elizabethan period, although then 
disclosure was of a quite different form. Inventors were compelled to 
use the patent to introduce the trade, and to teach the mystery of the art 
to native tradesmen. In the early eighteenth century the form and 
condition of disclosure changed. Patentees now had to describe the 
nature and manner of their inventions in a specification. . . . 
See also MACLEOD, supra note 298, at 49: 
Increasing emphasis by the judiciary on accurate and full specification 
culminated in Lord Mansfield’s decision in Liardet v. Johnson (1778). 
This stipulated that the specification should be sufficiently full and 
detailed to enable anyone, skilled in the art or trade to which the 
invention pertained, to understand and apply it without further 
experiment. For the first time, the recognized quid pro quo for the 
award of a patent was the disclosure of the invention. 
300 Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-12 (Apr. 10, 1790) (repealed 1793) (current 
version at 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2018)). Section 2 of the Patent Act of 1790 included a 
requirement that: 
[T]he grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting 
the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing, 
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, and 
explanations and models . . . of the thing or things, by him or them 
invented or discovered . . . . 
* * * 
[The] specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as 
not only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things 
before known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person 
skilled in the art or manufacture, whereof it is a branch, or wherewith 
it may be nearest connected, to make, construct, or use the same, to the 
end that the public may have the full benefit thereof, after the 
expiration of the patent term . . . . 
See also ALAIN POTTAGE & BRAD SHERMAN, FIGURES OF INVENTION: A HISTORY OF 
MODERN PATENT LAW 53, 59 (Oxford University Press 2010). Pottage and Sherman argue 
that specifications in the United States were introduced on “different principles from the 
ones that had developed in England and Europe” at least because “the text [in the United 
States] was explicitly seen through the medium of a contract rather than as a grant of a 
privilege.” Id. at 53. They further stated that, “[i]n part, this was a product of the ‘republican 
idiom,’” which they, nevertheless, related to the notion of patents as “contracts”: 
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administrative interference, those descriptions have been made 
available to the public by the Patent Office.301 
As previously discussed, Justice Thomas mischaracterized the 
significance of American Bell in Oil States when he explained that, 
“[b]y ‘issuing patents,’ the PTO ‘take[s] from the public rights of 
immense value, and bestow[s] them upon the patentee,’”302 in that 
the Court in American Bell was not relying on the “immense value” 
of “public rights” to justify unilateral power of the Patent Office  
to decide the fate of granted patents. Rather, the Court was only  
referring to prior activity or omission that would permit “cancel- 
lation or vacation of an instrument” obtained from the Patent  
Office.303 The scope of instances identified in American Bell for 
cancellation of a patent were laid out in dicta as including “fraud in 
the patentee,” patents “issued unadvisedly or by mistake, where the 
office has no authority in law to grant them, or where another party 
has a higher equity, and should have received the patent.”304 
Patents of invention are distinct from land patents in at least one 
respect, in that only patents in land are taken from the public do-
main. Stated conversely, unlike grants of land, patents of invention, 
if properly granted, have never been a possession of a sovereign  
 
Ideas were construed as things because they could be written 
down . . . . 
* * * 
This was reinforced by the fact that the republican idiom that 
underpinned American patent law (which was expressly influenced by 
developments in France) meant that the specification tended to be seen 
as a contract or bargain between the inventor and the state. 
Id. at 59. 
301 Id. at 56. Interestingly, William Thornton, the First Superintendent of Patents, from 
1802–1828, according to Walterscheid, “took the position that a specification [of a granted 
patent] could only be made available (a) if litigation was involved, or (b) if the inventor 
expressly authorized it, or (c) if the term of the patent had expired.” EDWARD C. 
WALTERSCHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS: AMERICAN PATENT LAW & 
ADMINISTRATION, 1798–1836, at 283 (1998)). This policy was reversed in 1825: “[S]ince 
1825 it has been the policy of the United States that any issued patent is available to the 
public upon payment of the requisite fee.” Id. at 302–03. 
302 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 
(2018) (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)). 
303 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 373. 
304 Id. at 365. 
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entity, whether that be a hereditary monarch or a government repre-
sentative.305 Patents of invention, therefore, are different, despite the 
parallel drawn by the Court in American Bell that they are of the 
same “nature, character, and validity” as land patents and “imply in 
each case the exercise of the power of the government according to 
modes regulated by acts of Congress.”306 
One consequential difference between patents of invention and 
land patents is the nature of the consideration offered in exchange 
for the grant. While abandonment or failure to make payment might 
be cause for revocation of a land patent, just as failure to work an 
invention was once a basis for revocation of a patent of invention, 
disclosure of an invention by a patent applicant cannot be undone. 
An invention is publicly disclosed once a patent of invention is 
granted in the United States, and this disclosure constitutes irrevo-
cable consideration by the patent applicant in exchange for the  
 
305 Deazley acknowledges difficulty in classifying intellectual properties, including 
copyright, trademark, and patent protection, as contrasted with other forms of property. See 
RONAN DEAZLEY, RETHINKING COPYRIGHT—HISTORY, THEORY, LANGUAGE 141, 143–144, 
165 (2006). He states that “they are akin to choses in action, in that they are abstract legal 
rights . . . [and so] are not rights in rem. On the other hand, neither do they represent a 
claim to receive some share or amount of another’s pre-existing property, as does a chose 
in action.” Id. at 141 (third emphasis added). He goes on to point out that “John Locke 
[1632–1704] himself did not consider that his theory of property extended to intellectual 
properties such as copyrights and patents.” Id. at 143–144 n.32. Although not directly 
discussed by Deazley, a reason for Locke’s opinion in this regard may be that his theories, 
such as that of the epigraph to this Article, pre-date the Statute of Anne (1710) respecting 
copyright, and at that time patents were generally considered privileges granted at the 
discretion of the crown, as discussed above. With respect to copyright, Deazley did, 
however, quote a passage by Locke referencing a proposal to “vest a priviledg in the author 
of the said book . . . .” Id. While Deazley considers intellectual properties to be monopolies, 
he suggests using new terminology, such as “Intellectual Property Freedoms” and 
“Intellectual Property Privileges,” in order to get away from entrenched views associated 
with the notion of “intellectual property rights,” and to thereby enable more “meaningful 
engagement with the implications of the interface between intellectual property and the 
concept of monopoly . . . .” Id. at 165. In making this suggestion, Deazley does not 
acknowledge that patents generally have not been considered to be privileges since the late 
eighteenth century. Cf. id. Regardless, to avoid confusion (i.e., Deazley’s “Phil Collins” 
conundrum, where “the sheer weight of the collective national and international 
consciousness, with its embedded system of cultural significance, presents a substantial 
challenge” to others (such as Phil Collins, the photographer, as opposed to the musician 
bearing the same name)), and for the purposes of this Article, use of the phrase “intellectual 
property rights” will be continued. See id. at 163–65. 
306 American Bell, 128 U.S. at 359. 
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limited temporal exclusionary right to make, use, sell, offer to sell, 
or import the invention in the United States.307 
This distinction was picked up in 2000 by the Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co. v.  
Samsung Electronics Co., discussed above,308 which denied defend-
ant “Samsung’s attempt to analogize a patent to a franchise for  
purposes of the mail and wire fraud statutes.”309 The court in Semi-
conductor Energy Laboratory relied, in particular, on the 1888  
Supreme Court case California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., also 
discussed above, to distinguish “franchises” as legislative carve-outs 
from public property for development.310 Implicit in this view of a 
“franchise” is that the subject matter over which eminent domain is 
exercised was first in the possession of the public and, therefore, 
available to be taken out of that domain to create the franchise. As 
stated by the Federal Circuit in Semiconductor Energy Laboratory, 
“[b]y contrast, the patent right to exclude a party from practicing a 
particular invention is never held by the sovereign, but only by the 
patentee after issuance.”311 The exclusionary right granted by the 
government is obtained in exchange for disclosure by the patent  
applicant. That disclosure, once the patent is granted, cannot be  
restored if the government, as grantee, decides at some later time to 
reconsider, such as during inter partes review.312 Any type of post-
 
307 Since enactment of the American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) in 1999, patent 
applications are automatically published eighteen months after filing. Pre-issuance 
publication could only be reserved in the U.S. application if the applicant committed at the 
time of filing not to file in other countries. American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
106-113, Div. B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (1999) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (2018)). 
Disclosure is best viewed, at the very least, as consideration in anticipation of a grant of a 
patent by the PTO, subject, of course, to substantive examination by the PTO prerequisite 
to said grant. 
308 See supra text accompanying notes 165–70. 
309 Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 204 F.3d 1368, 1380 (Fed. 
Cir. 2000). 
310 See supra note 130 and accompanying text; see also Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380 
(“A franchise involves a transfer of extant rights previously held exclusively by the 
sovereign.”) (citing California v. Cent. Pac. R.R. Co., 127 U.S. 1, 40 (1888)). 
311 Semiconductor, 204 F.3d at 1380. 
312 Oil States, 138 S. Ct. at 1374 (“Inter partes review is ‘a second look at an earlier 
administration grant’ . . . . Thus, inter partes review involves the same interests as the 
determination to grant a patent in the first place.”) (quoting Cuozzo Speed Techs., L.L.C. 
v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2144 (2016); United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899)). 
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grant examination, therefore, creates an irrevocability problem for 
patentees that is compounded by the fact that the threshold for  
revoking a patent under post-grant procedure is a preponderance of 
the evidence,313 which is much lower than the clear and convincing 
evidence standard applied by Article III courts to overcome the  
presumption of validity mandated by 35 U.S.C. § 282(a)(ii).314 
The idea of disclosure as consideration in exchange for an  
exclusionary right is not new. Biagioli, for example, recites Joseph 
Barnes, John Fitch’s nemesis in the steamboat interference cases of 
the 1780’s and 1790’s,315 as the first invocation of a “patent bargain” 
between an inventor and the public in the United States: 
 
313 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (“Evidential Standard—In an inter partes review instituted under 
this chapter, the petitioner shall have the burden of proving a proposition of unpatentability 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
314 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“In general—A patent shall be presumed valid.”); see 
also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 101 (2011). There, the Court stated: 
Our decision in RCA is authoritative. There, tracing nearly a century 
of case law from this Court and others, Justice Cardozo wrote for a 
unanimous Court that “there is a presumption of validity, a presump-
tion not to be overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence.” 
Although the “force” of the presumption found “varying expression” 
in this Court and elsewhere, Justice Cardozo explained, one “common 
core of thought and truth” unified the decisions: 
“[O]ne otherwise an infringer who assails the validity of a patent 
fair upon its face bears a heavy burden of persuasion, and fails 
unless his evidence has more than a dubious preponderance. If 
that is true where the assailant connects himself in some way with 
the title of the true inventor, it is so a fortiori where he is a 
stranger to the invention, without claim of title of his own. If it is 
true where the assailant launches his attack with evidence 
different, at least in form, from any theretofore produced in 
opposition to the patent, it is so a bit more clearly where the 
evidence is even verbally the same.” Id. at 8, 55 S. Ct. 928 
(internal citation omitted). 
The common-law presumption, in other words, reflected the universal 
understanding that a preponderance standard of proof was too 
“dubious” as a basis to deem a patent invalid. Ibid: see also id., at 7, 
55 S. Ct. 928 (“[A] patent . . . is presumed to be valid until the 
presumption has been overcome by convincing evidence of error”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
Id. (quoting Radio Corp. of Am. v. Radio Eng’g Labs., Inc., 293 U.S. 1 (1935)) (internal 
citations omitted). 
315 See generally THOMAS BOYD, POOR JOHN FITCH: INVENTOR OF THE STEAMBOAT 
(1935). 
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The earliest appearance of the image of the patent 
bargain in the United States is probably in Barnes 
(1792): “The property or right in a discovery being 
exclusively the inventor’s, having had its origin, and 
existing but in his mind; it follows, that a system for 
securing property in the products of genius, is a  
mutual contract between the inventor and the public, 
in which the inventor agrees, on proviso that the  
public will secure to him his property in, and the  
exclusive use of his discovery for a limited time, he 
will, at the expiration of such time, cede his right in 
the same to the public: thenceforth the discovery is 
common right, being the compensation required by 
the public, stipulated in the contract, for having thus 
secured the same.”316 
Robinson is also relied upon by Biagioli as an example of expression 
of the notion that patents are contracts, and that disclosure is  
consideration given by inventors in exchange for exclusionary rights 
for a limited period of time. As quoted from Robinson by Biagioli: 
A patent is a contract between the inventor and the 
public, by which the inventor, in consideration that 
the exclusive use of his invention is secured to him 
for a limited period of time, confers upon the public 
the knowledge of the invention during that period and 
an unrestricted right to use it after that period has  
expired . . . [.] The specification is the instrument in 
which the terms of these mutual considerations and 
promises are declared, and on its completeness and 
accuracy depends the validity and the value of the 
contract itself.317 
For Biagioli, the quid pro quo of “the patent bargain” conferred  
by the government is the specification, which, reciting Fessendon’s 
 
316 Mario Biagioli, Patent Republic: Representing Inventions, Constructing Rights of 
Authors, 73 SOC. RES. 1129, 1130 n.4 (2006) (citing JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE 
JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM OF PROMOTING THE 
PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS BY ASSURING PROPERTY IN THE PRODUCTS OF GENIUS (1792)). 
317 Id. at 1131 (quoting WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL 
INVENTIONS, VOL. II (1890)) (emphasis added). 
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treatise of 1810, “is the price . . . the patentee is to pay for  
his monopoly.”318 
Bottomley picks up on Biagioli’s theme, and offers language 
from Liardet v. Johnson, the first case understood to exemplify  
“patent as contract” doctrine, in 1778: 
Hence the law requires as the price the patentee 
should pay to the public for his monopoly, that he 
should, to the very best of his knowledge, give the 
fullest and most sufficient description of all the  
particulars on which the effect depends.319 
For Bottomley, disclosure of the invention came to be viewed as 
consideration given by the individual for the contractual grant of a 
limited period of exclusionary rights, which he directly links to a 
shift from consideration of “public good” to one of disclosure: 
[T]he chances of a patent being challenged in the 
Privy Council had been receding since 1688 and  
the Court of Chancery had already emerged as a  
jurisdiction in which patents could be enforced. Soon 
after, the introduction of the specification, which  
became mandatory in the 1730’s, heralded a funda-
mental change in the nature of the patent . . . . [T]he 
specification requirement displaced the “public 
good” as the consideration on which the patent was 
awarded . . . .320 
Bottomley views disclosure to be the patentee’s portion of the  
exchange that is the basis of modern intellectual property rights: 
In a system of privileges [under the Privy Council], 
the consideration on which the grant is made is one 
of “utility,” that the invention is of direct economic 
benefit . . . . In contrast, with the introduction of the 
specification, the consideration of the patent grant is 
 
318 Id. at n.5 (quoting THOMAS FESSENDON, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR NEW 
INVENTIONS: WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE FRENCH PATENT LAW, FORMS 49 
(1810)). 
319 SEAN BOTTOMLEY, THE BRITISH PATENT SYSTEM DURING THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION 1700–1852, at 88 (2014) (quoting Liardet v. Johnson (1778), 1 HPC 198). 
320 Id. at 171. 
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supposed to change. Now the patent is awarded for 
disclosing the invention via the specification. It is 
this reciprocal agreement . . . that underpins any 
modern intellectual property rights regime.321 
More particularly, while patents in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries had been granted based on the “utility,” or economic  
benefit to be conferred by practicing the invention, during the  
eighteenth century public disclosure of the invention in a speci- 
fication eventually replaced the requirement for use322 and patents 
were no longer considered privileges but, rather, common-law  
property rights that were not contingent upon practice of the inven-
tion by patentees.323 Bottomley, therefore, concurs with Baigioli’s 
“theoretical schema” that an increasing reliance on sufficiency of a 
written description of an invention was contemporaneous with a 
shift in the early eighteenth century away from viewing patents as 
“privileges” that are granted by a monarch and judged by the Privy 
Council for contribution to the “public good,” and toward an equi-
table right in property.324 
B. The Link Between Inter Partes Review and Ex Parte 
Reexamination 
Inter partes review (as well as post-grant review and covered 
business methods) are linked to the older proceeding of ex parte 
reexamination in that all of them can be initiated by the Patent Office 
by “a person” who would not necessarily have standing to challenge 
 
321 Id. at 46–47. 
322 Id. at 49 (“From the mid-eighteenth century onwards, the judiciary eschewed the 
public good as a matter for enquiry and instead concerned themselves with the sufficiency 
of the specification.”). 
323 Id. at 173 (“Before 1760, the beginning of the classical Industrial Revolution, the 
Privy Council had already yielded jurisdiction of patent cases to the equity and common 
law courts, and the specification had transformed the jurisprudential foundation of the 
entire system.”). 
324 Id. at 46–49 (“Mario Biagioli argues that it is only with this written requirement that 
there is a shift away from patents as early modes or privileges to patents as intellectual 
property rights . . . . The evidence from the [earliest] reports [where a specification was 
ordered] indicate developments consistent with Biagioli’s theoretical schema. 
Significantly, there was a concomitant decline in the extent to which the law officers 
examined the petition with a view to the ‘public good.’”) (citing Biagioli, supra note 316, 
at 1131). 
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a granted patent in an Article III court. Jurisdiction over the validity 
of granted patents overlaps between the Patent Office and Article III 
courts, putting patentees in double jeopardy of losing rights they 
contracted for with the government in consideration for disclosure 
of their inventions. Part VI.B.1 is a description of the systemic 
causes of overlapping jurisdiction, and Part VI.B.2 is a case study of 
overlapping jurisdiction in the context of reexamination, a case 
study that is now being replicated in more recent proceedings  
established for post-grant patent examination under the AIA. 
1. Overlapping Jurisdiction Consequent to Third-Party 
Standing 
At oral hearing before the Supreme Court, appellant Oil States 
attempted to distinguish between reexamination proceedings and  
inter partes review by stating that reexamination is “fundamentally 
examinational,” while inter partes review is “adjudicational.”325 No 
real explanation was provided for this distinction during the oral 
hearing except for the statement by Oil States that third party  
participation during reexamination proceedings, whether ex parte or 
inter partes, was “fundamentally a proceeding between the Patent 
and Trademark Office, between the Government and the patent 
owner.”326 Presumably, then, the distinction between reexamination 
proceedings on the one hand and inter partes review on the other 
would be the fact of participation by third parties, whereby the “fun-
damental” nature of the proceeding changes from one that is  
“between the Government and the patent owner” to a proceeding 
that “fundamentally” includes the third party. There is no mention 
of this distinction in any of the majority opinion, the concurrence by 
Justice Breyer, or Justice Gorsuch’s dissent. 
Perhaps the distinction is of no practical effect constitutionally, 
in which case the constitutionality of reexamination may be linked 
to that of inter partes review, and so should be discussed along  
with any critique of the Supreme Court’s holding in Oil States. 
Reexamination and inter partes review are, in fact, only two of  
several alternative statutory provisions for post-grant examination 
 
325 Transcript, supra note 14, at 4–5; see also supra notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
326 Transcript, supra note 14, at 4–5. 
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of patents by the Patent Office. As previously discussed, post grant 
examination proceedings other than reexamination and inter partes 
review include reissue and interference, both of which date to  
the middle of the nineteenth century, and the new proceedings  
introduced with the AIA, namely, “post-grant review, covered  
business methods, supplemental examination and statutory deriva-
tion proceedings.327 
There is, however, at least one crucial distinction of the older 
proceedings of reissue and interference proceedings from ex parte 
reexamination, IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs, in that a third party in these 
more recent proceedings need not have any interest in the validity 
of the patent, other than as a member of the public, in order to  
challenge a granted patent before the Patent Office.328 In interfer-
ence proceedings, the Patent Office is only competent to make  
determinations of priority between patent applications, or between a 
patent application and a granted patent, and only when provoked by 
another patent applicant, a patentee, or sua sponte by the Patent  
Office to challenge a patent applicant. Similarly, only a patentee can 
petition for reissue, and reissue is contingent upon surrender of the 
subject patent by the patentee. In both cases, the patent applicant or 
patentee provoking the interference or petitioning for reissue clearly 
has a property right at stake beyond simply being a member of  
the public. 
It is this capacity for third party initiation that renders ex parte 
reexaminations, IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs subject to scrutiny under 
constitutional separation of powers, because members of the public 
would lack standing in an Article III court. That the validity of  
issued patents can be tried in Article I, or “legislative” courts, sets 
up overlapping jurisdiction with “constitutional, or Article III 
courts. As we will see, overlapping jurisdiction is a basis for confu-
sion that attends current jurisprudence of reexamination and AIA 
post-grant proceedings of IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs. However, be-
cause IPRs were the subject of Oil States, our constitutional analysis 
 
327 See supra notes 4–7. 
328 Petitions for derivation proceedings under 35 U.S.C. § 135 and requests for 
supplemental examination under 35 U.S.C. § 257 are limited to patent applicants and patent 
owners respectively. 
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of post-grant proceedings will be limited to ex parte reexamination 
and IPRs; PGRs and CBMs will not be addressed, but would  
stand or fall with ex parte reexamination and IPRs for the reasons 
just introduced. 
2. A Case Study in Consequences of Reexamination of 
Patents as Contracts—Fresenius USA v. Baxter 
International 
If patents are contracts and disclosure is the consideration given 
by the patentee in exchange for a limited period of exclusivity, then 
reexamination of a granted patent and revocation of that patent  
without voluntary surrender of the patent by the patentee is a  
violation of that contract by the government that cannot be  
remedied, at least because the consideration of disclosure cannot be 
restored to the patentee. Introduction of ex parte reexamination in 
1980, in fact, was premised on a failure of the patent system to  
“uphold [the government’s] agreement with an inventor that in  
exchange for disclosure of new inventions the inventor’s rights will 
be protected.”329 At the time, ex parte reexamination was posed as a 
benefit to patentees that would provide greater assurance of validity 
without the great expense of litigation.330 The proposed legislation 
was met with little resistance; most testimony was enthusiastically 
supportive, complete with that of the daughter of an inventor and 
founder of a company that lost a patent in litigation: 
We were shocked to read the judge’s ruling and to 
find we had lost in all areas of our court fight—patent 
 
329 Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 2. 
330 See id.; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. As stated by Sen. Bayh: 
While patents are important to all businesses, they are the lifeblood to 
the independent or small business owner who uses the patent grant as 
a shield to protect their invention from stronger competitors. 
* * * 
Having a patent issued [of] dubious worth is a cruel hoax that benefits 
no one, least of all the patent holder. It is much better to be able to go 
back to the Patent Office under a reexamination procedure to 
determine the patent’s validity than it is to spend thousands of dollars 
in court and wind up with an invalid patent. 
Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 2. 
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infringement, trademark infringement, unfair com-
petition, and deceptive trade. The judge had ruled 
against us based on gray areas of law—the obvious-
ness doctrine and legal technicalities.331 
The reality subsequent to enactment of reexamination proceedings 
presents a much different picture, as summarized by commentators 
such as Gregory Dolin, who argues that, despite provisions to curb 
abuse, such as elevated fees to petition the Patent Office for  
reexamination, patentees are put at a disadvantage.332 Furthermore, 
reexamination has created what is effectively overlapping jurisdic-
tion by the Patent Office and the judiciary over the validity of issued 
patents, and has caused great confusion that undermines the reliance 
placed on granted patent rights by both the patentee and the public. 
For example, in Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter International, 
Inc., the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit vacated a district 
court judgment of patent infringement, stating that the plaintiff, 
Baxter International, Inc. (Baxter), no longer had a cause of action 
following cancellation of the claims at issue by the Patent Office in 
a reexamination proceeding.333 At issue was the finality of the  
district court judgment in view of a determination of invalidity of 
those claims by the PTAB during reexamination. More specifically, 
the district court previously had granted a motion by Baxter for 
judgement as a matter of law (“JMOL”) on claims of three patents 
that had not been shown to be invalid and were determined by the 
court to be infringed by the defendant.334 On appeal, the Federal  
Circuit reversed the district court, in part, but affirmed the district 
court’s grant of JMOL with respect to the claims of one of the three 
 
331 Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 32. 
332 See Dolin, supra note 8, at 913, 947 (“In short, the system designed by Congress is 
working against the very goals announced by Congress. . . . The data and the case studies 
presented in this Article show that the current system of post-issuance review can be, and 
is, abused.”). 
333 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 721 F.3d 1330, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(Fresenius II) (“In light of the cancellation of Baxter’s remaining claims, Baxter no longer 
has a viable cause of action against Fresenius. Therefore, the pending litigation is moot. 
We vacate the district court’s judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss.”). 
334 See Fresenius Med. Care Holdings Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. 03-1421, 2007 WL 
518804 at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2007). 
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patents at issue, and remanded the case to the district court to recon-
sider the royalty award and injunction in light of the partial reversal 
of the district court’s decision.335 On remand, the district court 
awarded damages to Baxter in a final judgment dated March 16, 
2012, which Fresenius appealed. Baxter cross-appealed, and on May 
3, 2012, the district court granted Fresenius a stay of execution of 
the judgment pending the outcome of the appeal.336 
While Fresenius v. Baxter was on remand, the Federal Circuit, 
in a separate proceeding, affirmed on May 17, 2012337 a decision by 
the Patent Office in a reexamination proceeding, thereafter issuing 
a mandate on November 2, 2012, that the claims at issue were  
invalid.338 The holding in Baxter by the Federal Circuit was not  
appealed by Baxter, the assignee of the patent and, accordingly, the 
Patent Office terminated the reexamination and issued a certificate 
canceling the claims,339 which were the same claims of the subject 
patent that had been held by the Federal Circuit in Fresenius v.  
Baxter to be not invalid and infringed.340 
In Fresenius I, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that “the  
cancellation of a patent’s claims cannot be used to reopen a final 
damages judgment ending a suit based on those claims.”341 How-
ever, for the court, the issue was whether “the judgment in this  
infringement case is sufficiently final so that it is immune to the  
effect of the final judgment in the PTO proceedings, as affirmed by 
this court in In re Baxter.”342 To make this determination, the court 
found it “important here to distinguish between different concepts 
 
335 See Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 582 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Fresenius I). 
336 See id. at 1334. The outcome of the appeal was Fresenius II, decided July 2, 2013. 
337 See In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012), reh’g en banc denied, 698 F.3d 1349 
(Fed. Cir. 2012). 
338 See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1335. The mandate by the Federal Circuit affirming the 
contemporaneous reexamination proceeding issued on November 2, 2012. 
339 See id.; see also Ex parte Reexamination Certificate, U.S. Pat. No. 5,247,434 C1 (Apr. 
30, 2013). 
340 See Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1335. 
341 Id. at 1340. 
342 Id. at 1341. 
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of finality,”343 concluding that the issue was not one of “dealing with 
finality for purposes of determining the potential res judicata effect 
of this infringement litigation on another suit,” but rather whether 
the Federal Circuit’s previous decision remanding the district court 
case was “sufficiently final to preclude application of the interven-
ing final judgment in In re Baxter.”344 The Federal Circuit held that 
their decision to “remand to the district court in Fresenius I did not 
end the controversy between the parties, or leave ‘nothing for the 
court to do but execute the judgment.’”345 As a result, cancellation 
of the claims at issue by the Patent Office by the time a decision on 
remand could be made to execute the 2007 district court judgment 
mooted reconsideration of the royalty award and injunction. 
In a strongly worded dissent in Baxter, Judge Newman excori-
ated the majority opinion as a holding that “violates . . . the consti-
tutional plan,” that has unlawfully “revised, overturned or  
refused faith and credit”346 of “[j]udgments . . . [made] within the 
power vested in courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitu-
tion.”347 Likewise, in a dissent to Fresenius II, Judge Newman  
did not generally contest the constitutionality of reexamination  
proceedings, but asserted that the “PTO can neither invalidate, nor 
revive, a patent whose validity the court has adjudicated,” without 
rendering “the court’s judgment no more than ‘advisory.’”348 She 
then recited in her Fresenius II dissent the standard for finality in 
each of the other federal district courts,349 none of which was so 
strict that it “leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
ment,” as required by the majority.350 According to Judge Newman 
and the several federal district courts, finality is specific to issues 
 
343 Id. at 1340. The court quoted 18A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & 
EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4432 (2d ed. 2002) 
(“Definitions of finality cannot automatically be carried over from appeals cases to 
preclusion problems.”). 
344 Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1341. 
345 Id. (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1994)) 
(emphasis added). 
346 In re Baxter, 678 F.3d 1357, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Newman, J., dissenting). 
347 Id. 
348 Fresenius II, 721 F.3d at 1349 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Gordon v. United 
States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1864)). 
349 Id. at 1355–58. 
350 Id. at 1341. 
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that “were finally decided in full and fair litigation.”351 In this case, 
the decision had been made with respect to patent validity and only 
the issues of updating damages and the injunction consequent to that 
determination remained.352 
Regardless of any standard for finality, the overriding issue,  
as stated by the district court, and as recited by Judge Newman,  
was the opportunity allowed for parties to game the system by  
employing reexamination as a “mere dilatory tactic.”353 As stated by 
the district court: 
Fresenius should not have waited until it had had a 
trial, had litigated motions for judgement as a matter 
of law and a new trial on the merits, and then had a 
favorable PTO action to request a stay. Any irrepara-
ble harm that Fresenius will suffer will be of its own 
making, attempting, as it did, to “game the system” 
by playing both fields simultaneously . . . . [T]o  
allow Fresenius to now derail this litigation would be 
to sanction the most blatant abuse of the reexamina-
tion process. The express purpose of the reexamina-
tion procedure is to shift the burden from the courts 
by reducing costly and time-consuming litigation.354 
Yet the reexamination process failed to prevent costly litigation 
from unfolding in this case, despite the President’s Commission on 
the Patent System in 1966 setting before Congress the objectives to 
“raise the quality and reliability of the U.S. Patent” and to “reduce 
the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent.”355 
 
351 Id. at 1354 (“All circuits impose finality and preclusion as to issues that were finally 
decided in full and fair litigation.”). 
352 Id. at 1359 (“Here, Fresenius contested liability and lost, by declaratory action brought 
in the district court, and on appeal to the Federal Circuit. All that remained on remand was 
an updating of the post-judgment royalty.”). 
353 Id. at 1357 n.2 (quoting Order at 6–8, Fresenius USA, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l., No. 
03-CV-1431 SBA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44107, *16–20 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2007) 
(quoting Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987))). 
354 Id. (emphasis added). 
355 See Patent Reexamination Hearing, supra note 32, at 53:  
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In Baxter,356 the Federal Circuit specifically anticipated criti-
cism that it would be “erroneously elevating the decision by the PTO 
over a decision by a federal district court, which decision has been 
affirmed by this court . . . .”357 The court’s answer to such criticism 
was that, “this case is not about the relative primacy of the courts 
and the PTO, about which there can be no dispute” but, rather, it is 
a consequence of the court’s inability to “conclude that the PTO  
was barred from conducting the reexamination of the ᾽434 patent 
because of the final judgment in Fresenius without overruling  
Ethicon and Swanson . . . .”358 
Ethicon v. Quigg, which had been decided in 1988, held that 
reexamination proceedings were dictated, by statute, to be con-
ducted with “special dispatch”359 and, therefore, could not be held 
in abeyance pending determination of litigation concerning a  
patent.360 The Federal Circuit in In re Swanson361 stated that courts 
do not uphold patent validity in civil litigation, but, rather, determine 
whether “a challenger who attacks the validity of patent claims . . . 
[has] . . . overcome the presumption of validity with clear and  
convincing evidence that the patent is invalid.”362 To put the  
Swanson court’s point in different words, one might say that courts 
 
Witness the report of the President’s Commission on the Patent System 
in 1966. Within the boundaries defined by the Commission, the 
Commission identified six objectives: 
First: To raise the quality and reliability of the US patent.  
*** 
Fourth: To reduce the expense of obtaining and litigating a patent. 
356 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
357 Id. at 1365. 
358 Id. 
359 Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1425–26 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“All reexamination 
proceedings under this section, including any appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences, will be conducted with special dispatch within the Office.”) (emphasis 
added) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 305) (1988)). 
360 Id. at 1426. The Court stated: 
The issue for us is whether “special dispatch” contemplates that a 
reexamination be suspended pending the outcome of a district court 
case involving allegations of invalidity of the same patent. We 
conclude that it does not. 
Id. 
361 In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
362 Id. at 1377 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282). 
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can properly decide whether, under the clear and convincing  
evidence standard, a granted patent is not invalid. Because validity 
is presumed, courts are not in fact tasked with deciding whether a 
patent is valid in an affirmative sense. 
For the Federal Circuit, therefore, while patent reexamination 
will not be stayed pending the outcome of litigation concerning the 
same patent, and the Patent Office, at any rate, is not bound by  
determinations of validity made by a court, a court is not free to up-
hold the validity of a patent previously determined to be invalid in a 
separate reexamination proceeding. Moreover, as stated in Ethicon, 
“if a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either upheld 
on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may discontinue its reexamina-
tion.”363 This, according to the court in Ethicon, is consistent  
with Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University Illinois Foun-
dation, which “held that where a patent has been declared invalid in 
a proceeding in which the ‘patentee has had a full and fair chance to 
litigate the validity of his patent,’ the patentee is collaterally  
estopped from re-litigating the validity of the patent.”364 In other 
words, while the patentee is collaterally estopped from re-litigating 
the validity of the patent found invalid by the Patent Office during 
reexamination or by another court, the Patent Office or another court 
can strike down a patent as invalid, despite a previous decision by 
either the Patent Office or an Article III Court to the contrary. 
In effect, while the Patent Office and Article III courts are both 
able to rule against the validity of a patent previously found valid or 
not invalid, respectively, in separate proceedings, neither the Patent 
Office nor Article III courts can uphold a patent in the face of a final 
contrary decision. The requirement of “special dispatch” put upon 
the Patent Office in reexamination proceedings365 may well not  
“elevate a decision by the PTO over the federal circuit court.”  
Nevertheless, this requirement does highlight that statutory post-
grant examination proceedings made available to third parties gives 
 
363 Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429. 
364 Id. (quoting Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 333 
(1971)). 
365 35 U.S.C. § 305. Both inter partes review and post-grant review are required to come 
to a “final determination” within one year of the institution of proceedings, with an 
extension for “good cause” not to exceed six months. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11). 
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rise to the problem of overlapping jurisdiction between the Patent 
Office and the Article III courts—a problem that, indeed, the special 
dispatch requirement exacerbates. 
C. A Plea for Reconsideration of Post-Grant Patent Examination 
Clearly, the odds are stacked against patentees, and the opportu-
nities for gamesmanship are many. Both of these factors seem to 
belie any original intent of the drafters of reexamination or any  
third-party post-grant examination legislation purporting to protect 
patentees from unrealistic expectations of the value of their patents, 
or that they are being provided with a low-cost alternative to litiga-
tion that would assist them in making appropriate business decisions 
about enforcement of their intellectual property.366 
In her dissent, Judge Newman in Baxter stated that she  
supported the “concept of reexamination as an efficient and eco-
nomical alternative to litigation in appropriate cases.”367 Her  
concern was with “the distortion of this purpose,” which, according 
to Judge Newman, “was not intended to undermine the finality  
of judicial process . . . [and thereby] “negate the repose provided  
by adjudication.”368 
The issues raised in Fresenius v. Baxter and In re Baxter are not 
limited to reexamination, but extend to IPRs, PGRs, and CBMs, and 
appear to be manifesting in these other proceedings as time goes 
on.369 Perhaps support for post-grant examination as a whole should 
 
366 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 330. 
367 In re Baxter Int’l, Inc., 678 F.3d 1357, 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
368 Id. Interestingly, though, Judge Newman also observed, like Professor Dolin, that the 
“only patents that are reexamined, like the only patents that are litigated, are patents on 
inventions that are of value.” Id. Dolin stated in his 2015 article, for example: 
[A]lthough the post-issuance review proceedings (whether of the 
pre- or post-AIA variety) have ostensibly been designed to eliminate 
“the worst patents,” they are not the ones that end up as the focus of 
these proceedings . . . . It is the patents that are economically valuable 
that get the most attention . . . . The perverse result is that it is the 
“best” rather than the “worst” patents that are subject to post-issuance 
review. 
Dolin, supra note 8, at 911–12 (citations omitted). 
369 The potential for gamesmanship consequent to overlapping jurisdiction of post-grant 
examination proceedings created by the AIA can be seen in recent cases, such as Versata 
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be reconsidered; the goal of providing an “economic alternative to 
litigation in appropriate cases” arguably has not been met by  
proceedings that can be initiated by “members of the public.” To the 
contrary, whatever certainty patentees believe is conferred by the 
presumption of validity associated with a granted patent has been 
seriously undercut by the alternative path of legislated third-party-
initiated post-issuance examination, whether it be by ex parte  
reexamination, post-grant review, inter partes review, or covered 
business method proceedings. The problems associated with these 
alternatives to litigation stem largely from what is, in effect, over-
lapping jurisdiction between the executive and judicial branches 
over patent validity that exacerbates uncertainty for patent holders, 
particularly those trying to make business decisions on the basis of 
granted patents. 
The key to resolving the high level of uncertainty associated 
with overlapping jurisdiction among government branches is to  
remove that jurisdiction from one of those governing branches. In 
this case, history provides a clear choice. Patents have been consid-
ered to be private property since the founding of this country370 and 
 
Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc., where the Federal Circuit affirmed the 
finality of a damages award despite apparently reopening that judgment for modification, 
and in the face of an intervening verdict of invalidity by the PTAB consequent to a CBM 
proceeding. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015); see also Opticurrent, LLC v. Power 
Integrations, Inc., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94615 *1 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2019). In 
Opticurrent, the plaintiff filed an emergency motion to enter a backdated judgment that 
would nullify a reexamination proceeding initiated by the defendant based on evidence the 
defendant deliberately withheld during an infringement trial. Separately, the Patent Office 
has made precedential at least two IPRs, NHK Spring Co., Ltd. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, 
Inc., No. IPR2018-00752 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 12, 2018) and Valve Corp. v. Electronic Scripting 
Products, Inc., Nos. IPR2019-00062, IPR2019-00063, IPR2019-00084 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 2, 
2019), and made informative two other cases, Becton Dickenson & Co. v. B. Braun 
Melsungen AG, No. IPR2017-01586 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2017) and Kayak Software Corp. 
v. IBM Corp., CBM2016-00075 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 15, 2016); setting forth and applying 
factors that are intended to curb abuse of post-grant examination proceedings. However, 
the proper channel for alleviation of those concerns is not reliance on self-restraint by the 
Patent Office, but, rather, to remove the overlap of jurisdiction that is at the root of the 
conflict enabling much abuse. 
370 See, e.g., Mossoff, supra note 25, at 700 (“Nineteenth century courts concluded that 
patents were constitutional private property based on a logical development in both patent 
and constitutional law.”). 
732          FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXX:645 
 
have a long history of regulatory oversight.371 While it is true that 
the grant of an exclusionary right to a patentee for a limited period 
of time embraces both private and public aspects in that the property 
right is held privately against public interests, the patentee has  
bargained for that exclusionary right by disclosing the patented  
invention to the world. As a contract, such disclosure constitutes 
consideration that, unlike working a plot of land or practicing an 
invention, cannot be returned or extinguished. Therefore, the con-
sideration of disclosure put up by patentees in exchange for a limited 
period of exclusivity should be honored by the Patent Office upon 
grant of exclusionary rights. Mistake on the part of the Patent Office, 
or even fraud on the part of patentees, will, of course, negate the 
value of that consideration, but these are fair game as defenses to 
infringement or in declaratory judgment actions before an Article III 
court. Post-grant examination by the Patent Office should be limited 
to fact finding as an adjunct to litigation before district courts, sub-
ject to a substantial evidence standard that would allow the Patent 
Office to apply its technical expertise to matters of fact.372 Failure 
to so limit post-grant examination proceedings will perpetuate the 
erosion of confidence currently underway in American patent law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court in Stern provided a narrow path for adjudi-
cation under Article I by expressly refraining from “any view on 
how the doctrine [of public rights exception] might apply in [a]  
different context [than that of a state law counterclaim].”373 How-
ever, despite potentially relevant Supreme Court decisions and dicta 
in Thomas and Granfinanciera, the better view under the weight of 
 
371 See JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST 
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (2012) (“[T]he first 
regulatory agency established outside of any executive department at the national level was 
not the ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission, in 1887]; it was the Patent Office, created 
ninety-seven years earlier.”). 
372 See supra text accompanying note 261. For a discussion of the development and  
role of the substantial evidence standard during expansion of administrative law in the  
early twentieth century, see generally DANIEL R. ERNST, TOCQUEVILLE’S NIGHTMARE: THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE EMERGES IN AMERICA, 1900–1940 (2014). 
373 Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 494 (2011); see also supra text accompanying note 
221. 
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Supreme Court precedent with respect to patent validity (but for the 
recent decision by the Court in Oil States), is that determination of 
the validity of issued patents does not include the government as a 
party and, therefore, only private rights are involved. 
To conceptualize patents within the narrow framework of “fran-
chises” is profoundly misleading, because from such a perspective 
their fate would seem to become merely a function of privileges to 
be maintained at the discretion of a sovereign. Rather, a patent  
historically has been, and should continue to be, conceived of as a 
contract governing a property transaction between the government 
and the patentee. This contract has two key features: the patentee 
holds private rights conferred by the government in consideration of 
the patentee’s disclosure; and the contract is cancellable only pursu-
ant to review by an independent and neutral branch of government. 
Jurisdiction over the validity of granted patents should, there-
fore, be solely under Article III. Statutory provisions for post grant 
examination at the Patent Office should be limited to an advisory 
capacity as an adjunct to a federal district court and address only 
issues of fact. Such factual determinations coming from the Patent 
Office should be subject to review for substantial evidence by a  
district court in order to pass constitutional muster. 
